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Introduction
This paper will examine the relations of the Pridi-controlled Free Thai regimes with Indochinese in-
dependence movements and the support the Thai government provided to the anti-French struggle 
that broke out in Indochina following France?s sudden return after the war. It will also examine Pridi?s 
concept of a Southeast Asian League and the eﬀorts of his Free Thai regimes to counter French de-
mands for the return of the Indochina territories that the Phibun government had recovered for Thai-
land in May 1941 with the Treaty of Tokyo, where the Thai had established four new provinces. How-
ever after World War Two, the Thai were facing a colonial power, France that was determined to 
reincorporate these territories into Indochina as part of their intention of re-establishing the status quo 
antebellum in their colony. Then it will examine the attitude of the second Phibun government toward 
Indochina from the time of the 8 November 1947 coup d?état, when the military overthrew the Free 
Thai government and drove Pridi out of the country, until 1950 and the full-fledged onset of the Cold 
War.
Thailand?s international position after the Second World War was entirely diﬀerent from what it had 
been in 1940 when its territorial dispute with Indochina broke out. Although Pridi?s Free Thai move-
ment had co-operated with the Allied powers during the war, this did not remove the Allied image of 
Thailand as an aggressor that had expanded its territory at the expense of its neighbors and had allied 
itself with Japan. With the end of the war, British troops moved into Thailand to disarm the Japanese 
forces, and the country found itself placed virtually under British military occupation. It was interna-
tionally isolated and treated like a defeated nation. Meanwhile, France was receiving British and Amer-
ican support, and there was no other great power that Thailand could rely on to restrain the French.
The postwar French government did not acknowledge the Vichy interregnum and declared that the 
state of belligerency since the Thai?Indochina territorial dispute continued to exist between Thailand 
and France. It demanded the return of the territories that Thailand had acquired in the 1941 Treaty of 
Tokyo and had reorganized into four new Thai provinces. Having gained the backing of the US and 
  1 The present article is, by and large a translation of the second half of my article in Japanese, ?1940 Nendai Ni Okeru Tai no 
Shokuminchi Taisei Dakkyakuka to Indoshina no Dokuritsu Undo? [Thailand?s role in the breakdown of colonialism and 
Indo?China?s independence movements in the 1940s] in Isobe Keizo ed., Betonamu to Tai [Vietnam and Thailand] (Tokyo: 
Taimeido, 1998). The first half of the Japanese article was published in English as Eiji Murashima, ?Opposing French Colo-
nialism: Thailand and the Independence Movements in Indo?China in the early 1940s,? South East Asia Research, 13, 3 
(2005): 333?83.
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Britain, on 17 November 1946 France finally succeeded in getting Thailand to accept an agreement re-
solving the territorial dispute and returning the four provinces to Indochina. However, the agreement 
also provided for the establishment of an international Commission of Conciliation that would reex-
amine the territorial issue between the two countries.
Given the diﬃcult international environment that Thailand found itself in after the war, Pridi and 
his civilian Free Thai government could only adopt one of two approaches for coping with the territo-
rial issue. One was to restore amicable relations with Britain and the US, especially with the latter, to 
gain support in peace negotiations with France in order to retain at least some portion of the four 
provinces recovered in 1941. The other approach was to advocate the United Nations principle of na-
tional self-determination and demand the independence of Laos and Cambodia inclusive of the four 
provinces. This second approach formed the basis for Pridi?s concept of a Southeast Asian League 
made up of Thailand and the independent states of Indochina.
Even before the end of the war, Pridi and the other leaders of the Free Thai movement recognized 
that trying to retain Thailand?s territories in Indochina while supporting Indochina?s independence 
did not represent compatible policies. The dilemma they felt came out in a remark by Prime Minister 
Thamrong Nawasawat, whose cabinet had inherited the policies of the Pridi cabinet. Speaking to the 
House of Representatives (the lower house of the National Assembly) on 5 November 1947, Thamrong 
commented,
We were never determined to regain the territories at any cost. Were Laos and Cambodia to be-
come totally independent nations, then what both of them did, and whether they formed a federa-
tion with someone else or not would be a problem for the future and for them to decide. Without 
doubt Thailand would have benefited from the outcome. However, we were not able to state this 
clearly to the Commission of Conciliation. What I mean is that in the [mediation of the] Franco?
Siamese Agreement of Settlement, there was only the choice of leaving unchanged or of revising 
the [borders in the 1893, 1904, 1907 Franco?Siamese] treaties. Matters that were political issues 
were outside of the Commission of Conciliation?s authority.2 
The postwar Free Thai regimes under Pridi?s control initially pursued the second approach in deal-
ing with the territorial issue, but being unable to obtain US or British support, the Thai government 
was prevented from bringing its claim before the United Nations. Then after Bangkok found that it 
would be compelled to retrocede its four Indochinese provinces to France as a condition for setting up 
  2 Raingan Kanprachum Sapha Phuthaen Ratsadon Pho. So. 2490 [Proceedings of 1947 House of Representatives] [henceforth 
Raingan 2490] (1st Regular Session, vol. 2; and 1st Extraordinary Session), pp. 3184?86. Prince Wan recalled that rather than 
return even a small piece of territory, the Thai government intended to demand the independence of Laos and Cambodia; Roi 
pi Phon Tri Phrachao Worawongthoe Krommamun Narathippphongpraphan/The Centennial of H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithaya-
kon? (Bangkok: Khana Anukammakan Chattham Ekkasan, 1991), p. 120.
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the Commission of Conciliation, the Thai government was left with only the first approach. However, 
in the closing stages of the mediation, when the Thai concluded that the final outcome was not going 
to be in their favor, they again argued for the principle of national self-determination. Thus after re-
jecting the mediation proposal, Thailand once again sought to pursue the second approach.
1. Postwar Thai Support for the Independence Movements in Indochina
From the time of their territorial dispute with Indochina, the Thai empathized with the anti-French 
struggle for independence in Indochina, and they saw themselves as comrades with the peoples of In-
dochina in the fight to rid the region of French colonialism. Thai feelings of solidarity and sympathy 
expanded all the more rapidly after the war when the French gained British support in the armed sup-
pression of the independence movements, and France openly displayed its intention to take back its 
colonies in Indochina. After British forces moved into Thailand at the end of the war, they made free 
and uninvited use of Northeastern Thailand to assist the French military in the latter?s return to Indo-
china. Not only did they allow supplies for the French forces to be shipped to Laos via Thailand?s 
Northeast, but the French were even allowed to launch their reoccupation of Laos from there. Watch-
ing this blatant British?French co-operation in the suppression of the Lao Issara and Việt Minh in 
Laos, it was hardly an exaggeration to say that the people of Northeastern Thailand sympathized with 
the struggle of their Lao compatriots with whom they shared the same ethnic identity.
1.1?Support for the Lao Issara
On 19 August 1945, immediately after the war ended, a five-man team of British soldiers, which in-
cluded a Lt. Col. Green and a Maj. Peter Kemp, arrived in Sakon Nakhon from India. Sakon Nakhon 
was a Free Thai base and the hometown of Tiang Sirikhan (1909?1952), a central figure in the Free 
Thai movement in Northeastern Thailand.3 The British team immediately received the assistance of 
Tiang?s Free Thai organization and the provincial Governor. From Sakon Nakhon Lt. Col. Green head-
ed for Ubon province while Maj. Kemp went to Nakhon Phanom.4 Both provinces bordered on the 
Mekong and had important transportation and communication routes with Laos. The duty of the Brit-
ish team was to overcome any resistance by the Japanese army, secure the safety of Allied prison-
ers-of-war, and help the French return to Indochina.
In Nakhon Phanom at the end of August, Kemp succeeded in making contact with 1st-Lt. Kolz, a 
French guerrilla operating across the Mekong in Thakhek. On 7 September Kemp crossed over to 
Thakhek to provide relief for prisoners-of-war and French families. Thereafter, however, his task and 
that of other British oﬃcers who arrived in the region came to be mainly assisting French guerrillas 
(which included Prince Boun Oum of Champassak and his followers) in their fight against the Việt 
  3 From August 1945 to January 1946 and again from August 1946 to May 1947, Tiang Sirikhan was a Cabinet Minister-with-
out-Portfolio.
  4 National Archives of Thailand (hereafter NAT), So.Ro.0201.37.6/21.
?     ?
Eiji Murashima
158
Minh and the Lao Issara. Lt. Kolz was shot and killed by the Việt Minh on the 27th of September.
Meanwhile near the end of the war, Oun Sananikone and other Lao exiles in Thailand organized 
with US military assistance a Free Lao force which operated as part of Tiang Sirikhan?s Northeastern 
Free Thai organization. Under Oun?s command, this 300-man force entered Savannakhet unopposed 
on 7 September 1945 and took control of the town. But on the 18th of that month the town was at-
tacked by a French-led guerrilla force, and 14 Việt Minh and 2 Lao Issara fighters were killed.
At this point in time the Việt Minh and Lao Issara both had unrealistic expectations of the United 
States and China. On 18 September a group of US Army oﬃcers led by a Maj. Benn arrived from Kun-
ming on a tour of inspection of Nakhon Phanom, Thakhek and Savannakhet. They came with the in-
tention of restraining the fighting that was occurring between the French-led guerrillas and the Việt 
Minh/Lao Issara. The British expressed displeasure with this US intervention, and on 29 September Lt. 
Col. Green, as the highest ranking Allied oﬃcer in Northeastern Thailand, ordered the US oﬃcers to 
leave. On 1 October, Maj. Benn told the Governor of Nakhon Phanom,
The British are criticizing the US for siding with the Việt Minh and Lao Issara and instigating in-
cidents, but this is contrary to the facts. The US has taken a neutral position and is dealing 
even-handedly with the situation. The disarming of the Japanese forces in Thailand is the respon-
sibility of the British army, so it is unfortunate, but there is no good way that the US can keep the 
British in check. When the [Kuomintang] Chinese [occupation] army arrives in Indochina, we 
will withdraw. We are here only in the position of observers, but we will do the maximum we can.5 
Benn and his group departed Nakhon Phanom on 6 October and returned to Kunming. That same 
day at 8 o?clock in the morning, a force of 20 Chinese soldiers arrived in Thakhek from Vientiane. A 
few days prior to their arrival, some French-led guerrillas with the help of Maj. Kemp had attempted to 
occupy Thakhek before the Chinese could take over, and this set oﬀ a fierce battle with the Việt Minh 
and Lao Issara.
On 29 September a British aircraft flew over Thakhek and dropped weapons to the pro-French guer-
rillas, but some of these fell into the hands of the Việt Minh and Lao Issara. To keep supplies and 
equipment from falling into enemy hands, on 3 October the British began using the Nakhon Phanom 
airport to drop supplies to the French guerrillas. This meant that Thai territory was being used to sup-
press the independence movement in Indochina. The Governor of Nakhon Phanom initially opposed 
the use of his province for transporting weapons to French-led guerrillas across the river, but with 
Bangkok tacitly accepting the situation, the Governor likewise acquiesced.6 But the Thai Army handed 
over to the British military in Thailand a letter of protest dated 8 December 1945. In the letter the Thai 
side said, ?We want to point out that nowhere in the four provisions of the military agreement con-
  5 Ibid.
  6 Ibid.
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cluded on 8 September 1945 between the Thai military command and the Southeast Asia Command is 
there anything expressly written that gives the French permission to use Nongkhai and Nakhon Pha-
nom as military bases for their military operations in French-Indochina.? Attached to the letter was a 
table showing that from 23 September to 12 November, Nongkhai airport across the Mekong from 
Vientiane had been used six times (23 Sep, 25 Sep, 28 Sep, 30 Sep, 4 Oct, 12 Nov) to drop French para-
troopers and weapons; that during the same period, Nakhon Phanom airport had been used for the 
same purpose five times (3 Oct, 11 Oct, 20 Oct morning, 20 Oct afternoon, 23 Oct); and that weapons 
had been turned over to the French-led guerrillas in Laos by the British oﬃcers Kemp and Winn.7
It seems that the Chinese army arrived in Vientiane in the middle of September 1945. They stopped 
French paratroopers about four kilometers outside of Vientiane and prevented them from entering the 
city while letting the Lao government under Prime Minister Phetsarath continue to stay in power. 
Phetsarath?s government had come to power following the Japanese army?s coup de force in March, and 
it remained in control of Vientiane until the Lao Issara government was set up on 12 October 1945. 
Quickly reviewing the situation in Laos following the Japanese coup, on 5 April Japanese forces occu-
pied the royal capital of Luang Phrabang, and on the 8th of that month King Sisavangvong declared 
Laos an independent kingdom. As Prime Minister of the newly independent Lao government, 
Phetsarath ruled from Vientiane, and he continued to maintain his control even after Japan surren-
dered in August 1945.
When the former French Resident-Superior of Laos tried to resume his duties on 1 September 1945, 
Phetsarath asserted that the agreements between France and its protectorate of Laos had become null 
and void with the Japanese coup de force in Indochina and the resumption of Lao independence. It was 
also at this time that Phetsarath advocated to the Nongkhai Governor the concept of a greater Laos 
that included Northeastern Thailand. Then on 15 September without any consultation with pro-French 
King Sisavangvong, Prime Minister Phetsarath declared the formation of a unified Kingdom of Laos 
that included the southern region of the country which until then had been governed as a separate ad-
ministrative unit. Following this, on 4 October the Prime Minister issued a proclamation calling on 
the Allied powers to recognize the government of Laos and to guarantee Lao sovereignty and unity. 
These moves infuriated the French, and on 10 October King Sisavangvong announced in Luang Phra-
bang that Phetsarath had been dismissed from his positions as Viceroy and Prime Minister.8
On 12 October, immediately after Phetsarath?s dismissal, a group led by the Lao Issara that was seek-
ing to create an independent Laos under a constitutional monarchy proclaimed in Vientiane in the 
name of Phaya Khammao, chairman of the People?s Committee, a 41-article ?Lao Issara Constitution.? 
Two days later, on 14 October, the cabinet ministers of the Issara government were installed with 
Khammao taking the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The government?s 11-man cabinet 
  7 NAT, (3) So.Ro.0201.9/2.
  8 3349, Chao Phetcharat Burut Lek Haeng Racha?anachak Lao [Prince Prince Phetsarath, Iron Man of Laos] (Bangkok: Ruam 
Mit Thai, 1956), pp. 88 and 119?26.
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included Oun Sananikone as Minister of Economic Aﬀairs and Tham Xayasithsena as Deputy Foreign 
Minister. Both of these men had sought exile in Thailand at the time of the Thai?Indochina territorial 
dispute in 1940; they co-operated with the Free Thai leaders during the latter part of the war, and they 
worked to organize the Lao Issara movement. On the 15th of October the new Prime Minister of Laos 
asked the Governor of Nongkhai to convey to the Thai Foreign Minister a telegram saying in essence 
that ?a revolution has taken place in Laos, and a new government has come into being.?9 In this way 
dual governments came into existence in Laos after the war: one in Luang Phrabang which was pro-
French and headed by the king, and the other in Vientiane which was for independence and under the 
control of the Lao Issara.
On 16 October the Prime Minister?s Oﬃce of the new Lao Issara regime released the following dec-
laration:
After France lost control over Laos [in March 1945], our beloved country fell into complete disor-
der. This was because there was no royal personage [chao nai] who was able to establish clear and 
stable rule. Contacts between the provinces became diﬃcult. National finances weakened to the 
point where oﬃcials could not be paid their salaries. We suﬀered nothing but losses diplomatical-
ly, and nothing improved for us militarily. But worse still, the King in Luang Phrabang signed an 
agreement making Laos [once more] a colony of France. This is against the Lao public will which 
does not want to be ruled by a foreign country and is demanding only independence. As the rep-
resentative of all the people of Laos, we the People?s Committee fear that left in its present state, 
the strength of the country will be broken down leading to the destruction of the nation. There-
fore we have come together with the soldiers, oﬃcials, the Lao youth and the people in general in 
concurring to change our system of government from a monarchy to a democracy [constitutional 
monarchy]. The People?s Committee has drawn up a Constitution that sets down the fundamental 
principles of the new government. To cope with the tumultuous conditions that are overtaking 
our country, this Constitution has been set forth as an Interim Constitution. When order has re-
turned to the nation, the people?s representative assembly will appoint a drafting committee draw 
up a Permanent Constitution. The Interim Constitution is composed of 41 articles. The main arti-
cles are concerned with such important matters as the nation?s territory, the authority of the King, 
the People?s Representative Assembly and the Cabinet, the rights and duties of the Lao people, the 
relationship of the King as the Head of State with the People?s Representative Assembly and the 
Cabinet, and the relationship between the Cabinet and the People?s Representative Assembly. The 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Every individual and group is under the authority of 
the Constitution. The King, the Cabinet, the People?s Representative Assembly, and the people in 
general must respect and obey the Constitution. Violating the Constitution is absolutely forbid-
  9 NAT, (3) So.Ro.0201.9/4.
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den. However, the Constitution is not immutable and can be amended. The present Interim Con-
stitution has been drafted to cope with the current conditions, and in the future articles that no 
longer suit the needs of the country can be amended. The Oﬃce of the Prime Minister. 16 October 
1945.?10
There were many politicians native to Northeastern Thailand who participated in or co-operated 
with the Lao Issara government. Free Thai leaders like Tiang Sirikhan and Thongin Phuriphat (1906?
1949) were very much involved. But there were also many non-Free Thai activists like Fong Sitthitham 
(1904?1981), an influential political leader from Ubon.11 Siphanom Phichitwarasan (born 1918, elect-
ed to the House of Representatives from Sakon Nakhon province in 1979), a Northeastern Thai from 
Roi Et province who joined the Lao Issara movement, recalled the activities of Fong and other Thai ac-
tivists in the movement:
The outbreak of the Thai?Indochina territorial dispute really aroused us Isan people [Northeast-
ern Thai], and we really felt a deep sense of sympathy for the struggle of our Læm Thong [?Golden 
Peninsula,? used to refer to the mainland Southeast Asian region] brothers and sisters to regain 
their independence. As my teacher, Mr. Fong always told me that the history of Thailand and Laos 
was inseparable, and as shown by the Srisongrak memorial at Dan Sai, they have always helped 
each other in time of need. So when Laos is suﬀering, he would tell me emphatically, we are all 
caught up together in the same suﬀering. Mr Fong?s hope was to see his Læm Thong brothers and 
sisters liberated from the colonial rule of a foreign race. At the end of 1944 before my posting to 
the Phayap [Northern] Army, when I met him, Mr Fong was sure that Japan would lose the war, 
and he asked me what would be a way we could help our compatriots in Laos. I told him that 
since he was a political leader, how about if he went to Vientiane and met with some bigwigs up 
there. Not long afterwards, in early 1945, through the good oﬃces of Bouachan Inthavong, Mr 
Fong was able to meet with Savang Vatthana, the Crown Prince of Laos. Mr Fong urged the 
Crown Prince to get weapons from the Japanese army and lead the people to independence from 
the French. But the Crown Prince answered most uninspiringly that being a small country with a 
small population, how could Laos possibly oppose a great power like France after it had decided 
to come back? Returning disappointed from Vientiane, Mr Fong discussed the situation with 
Tiang Sirikhan, Thongin Phuriphat, Thawin Udon, and Chamlong Daoruang, four former Thai 
Cabinet Ministers, and with Phon Saensaradi, a member of the House of Representatives from 
Khonkhæn province. They decided to help the Lao people organize a Free Lao [Seri Lao] move-
ment [separate from the Lao Issara] for the purpose of liberating Laos. So Tiang Sirikhan was not 
 10 Ibid.
 11 Fong was a member of the House of Representatives elected from Ubon province. In 1946 and again in 1948 he was a Minis-
ter-without-Portfolio in the Khuang Aphaiwong Cabinet.
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only important in the Free Thai, he also played an important role in the initial organizing of the 
Free Lao movement in Thailand.?12
Another Northeasterner not in the Free Thai who joined the Lao Issara was Amphon Suwannabon 
(elected to the Thai House of Representatives from  Roi Et province in 1952). He had been a middle 
school teacher, and ?as an interpreter for the Japanese army, he traveled all over Læm Thong. He was 
doing this work in Vientiane when the war ended. Remaining there after the war, he organized a Lao 
Issara military unit and fought against the French. He was also involved in drafting the Lao constitu-
tion.?13 The Lao Issara constitution had many points of similarity with the Thai June 1932 provisional 
constitution adopted after the constitutional revolution. This is probably because Thai like Amphon 
Suwannabon took part in its drafting. The design of the national flag used by the Issara government, 
which is still the current national flag of Laos, was conceived, according to Siphanom Phichitwarasan, 
by a number of Lao intellectuals that included Maha Sila Viravong and Amphon Suwannabon. The flag 
has upper and lower stripes of red separated by a band of navy blue. According to its creators, the cen-
tral band of navy blue represents the Mekong, and the upper and lower stripes of red stand for the left 
and right banks of Laos and Northeastern Thailand.14
The views of the Lao leadership about the future course of Laos fell into three groups: 1) those who 
argued for remaining under France, 2) those who argued for merging with or joining in a federation 
with Thailand, and 3) those who called for a greater Laos. What was the thinking of the Northeastern 
Thai political leaders who supported and/or joined the Lao Issara? It is not really possible to separate 
them neatly into supporters of either arguments 2) or 3). Like Phetsarath in Vientiane, their thinking 
oscillated between the two. Were they to fall under the suspicion of the government in Bangkok, their 
activities could be seen as encouraging argument 3). As will be discussed later, in November 1948, be-
cause of suspicions that a secessionist revolt was being planned in the Northeast, the central govern-
ment arrested important Northeastern leaders who were involved in the Lao movement for indepen-
dence. At the same time it is also possible that the Lao leaders native to the left bank of the Mekong 
were wary of their Northeastern Thai brethren, suspecting them of being Bangkok?s agents for expand-
ing Thailand?s territory. The reason for surmising this is that although Northeastern Thai did import-
ant work for the Lao Issara government, none were appointed to any top-ranking positions; their roles 
were never more than working behind the scenes as advisors.15
 12 Cremation Volume for Fong Sitthitham (in Thai), 1982, pp. 50?55. According to a report by the Governor of Nongkhai, after 
the coup de force in Indochina and King Sisavangvong?s declaration of Lao independence, on 16 April 1945 the Japanese mili-
tary took Crown Prince Savang Vatthana from Luang Phrabang to Thakhek traveling via Vientiane and Nongkhai. It would 
seem that Fong met the Crown Prince in Vientiane at that time.
 13 Issue Commemorating the Opening of the Seri Prachathipatai Party Oﬃce (22 Dec 1955 issue, in Thai).
 14 From the author?s interviews (11 Nov. 1997, 5 Jan. and 18 March 1998) with former Maj. Siphanom Phichitwarasan; elected 
in 1979 to the House of Representatives from Sakon Nakhon province, he was the leader of a Parliamentary delegation that 
visited Vietnam in 1983.
 15 Ibid. Siphanom?s grandfather had migrated from Laos to Northeastern Thailand. His father was engaged in distribution and 
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The Lao Issara government in Vientiane opposed the French-backed royal government in Luang 
Phrabang, and the former looked very much to China and the United States for support. On 20 Octo-
ber, Khammao, the Prime Minister of the Lao Issara government, told the People?s Representative As-
sembly about the government?s policy to cope with the country?s current diﬃcult situation. The policy 
had four parts, and the one dealing with diplomacy stated that ?The government would exert every ef-
fort to realize the complete independence of Laos, and it would use every means possible to make con-
tact with the United Nations.?16
Soon after its establishment, the Lao Issara government also issued a declaration directed at ?Lao 
compatriots, Lao youths, soldiers and government oﬃcials, and Vietnamese and Chinese compatriots? 
in which it explained the reason for the existence of dual governments in Luang Phrabang and Vien-
tiane. The declaration said in part:
We still regard the King [in Luang Phrabang] to be the King of the nation. However, the King is 
not residing in Vientiane, which is the capital of Laos. Therefore the government [in Vientiane] is 
ruling provisionally in place of the King. Regarding the Viceroy Phetsarath, we very much vener-
ate His Highness, and in no way are making light of his authority. His Highness has expressed his 
happiness and satisfaction in assisting us. His Highness has now been divested of his position as 
Viceroy in the royal government of Luang Phrabang. Hence our actions now are doing no harm 
either to the King or to the Viceroy. 
The declaration also revealed that Prime Minister Khammao had not only long been maintaining se-
cret contacts with China, but had also been maintaining contacts with US military personnel in Thai-
land, and that those responsible for these particular contacts were also maintaining liaison with the 
Thai.17 The declaration stated that the results of the contacts with the American military personnel 
?have brought us the greatest success. We have received a promise from the US military that they will 
strive to help us gain the independence of Laos.? There were no names provided of the responsible for 
these contacts, but most likely the central figure would have been the Deputy Foreign Minister, Tham 
Xayasithsena. Back in 1940 he had gone into exile in Thailand, and as a member of the Lao Issara in 
the latter part of the war, he had been involved the most in negotiations with the British and Ameri-
cans.18 The declaration also expressed an attitude like that of the Thai in saying that, ?The Thai and the 
trade in the Northeast. Siphanom himself studied in Bangkok from the time of middle school, but he strongly identified him-
self as a Lao and felt an antagonism for the Thai? domination of Laos. He joined the Lao Issara and considers himself to be a 
Lao.
 16 NAT, (3) So.Ro.0201.9/4.
 17 Ibid.
 18 Siphanom considered that Tham Xayasithsena had the most important role in organizing the Free Lao and should be one of 
those personages mentioned specifically in Laos?s history. Reminiscing about Tham, Siphanom said: ?He was the important 
driving force in organizing the Free Lao. At the time of the Thai?Indochina territorial dispute, he along with Oun Sanan-
ikone, Oudone Sananikone, Bouachan Inthavong, Maha Sila Viravong and other activists were the first generation to flee 
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Laos are one and the same race, and like Thailand, Laos hopes to be free.?
A memorandum dated 29 May 1947 to the Franco?Siamese Commission of Conciliation dealing 
with Thailand?s lost territories (discussed later in this paper), submitted by the Thai government agent 
(representative), Prince Sakon Worawan (Tiang Sirikhan was deputy agent), contained the comment 
that ?at the end of the war in the Pacific and after the surrender of the Japanese Forces, a Movement 
called the Free Lao [the Lao Issara] was formed and assisted the Chinese Army in disarming the Japa-
nese troops.?19 This comment assumes that the Lao Issara was only organized after the war and that it 
co-operated with the Chinese military. With the Chinese army occupying Laos at that time, maintain-
ing good relations with China would have been one of the greatest concerns of the Issara government. 
But beyond this, for the sake of its own survival, the regime very much wanted China?s support.
In his article, Siphanom Phichitwarasan reported that in early 1946 he visited Vientiane before the 
city fell to the French:
Amphon Suwannabon [in Vientiane] told me the following good news. He had met with the com-
mander of the Kuomintang?s 93rd Division which had come into Laos to disarm the Japanese. The 
commander showed genuine sincerity for the recovery of Laos?s independence. He talked about 
the long history of close relations between China and Laos, and then after saying Laos should fight 
untiringly and unceasingly to regain its independence, the commander expressed the following 
opinion. He said that Laos had once been a great nation, and there were more than a few Lao peo-
ple living in Yunnan province. If unification was what the Lao people desired, on the morning af-
ter the French had been had been driven out, China would present those lands and their people to 
the country of Laos. China would do this without grudge or refusal, so the commander urged 
Laos to do all that it could to first achieve its independence. If this could not be achieved now, 
then an idea would be to send people to the 93rd Division?s base in Yunnan for combat training. 
After building up its military power, Laos could fight until winning independence. Amphon Su-
wannabon then took me to meet with Prime Minister Khammao. We decided that if it was not 
possible to keep control of Vientiane, everyone would move across to Thailand, and from there we 
would consider how to carry on fighting until achieving independence. Not long afterwards, Vien-
across the Mekong River to escape the brutal rule of the French. As representative of the movement to recover Lao indepen-
dence, he had a conference with Tiang Sirikhan and oﬃcers from Britain and the US in the Dong Phrachao forest near Nong 
Luang village in Sawang Daendin district of Sakon Nakhon, where an important Free Thai base in Northeastern Thailand was 
located. At that conference he was given the political and military authority to organize the Free Lao, and he was dispatched 
to Vientiane. This was later changed to the Lao Issara, and it succeeded in liberating Laos from the yoke of the French? (Cre-
mation Volume for Fong Sitthitham, p. 51). Oun Sananikone also wrote that Tham Xayasithsena along with Oun himself had 
been part of the Free Thai in Northeastern Thailand at the end of World War II, and that Tham had received assistance from 
the US and had the most important role in organizing a Lao anti-Japanese force (the Free Lao); Oun Sananikone, Lao Issara: 
The Memoirs of Oun Sananikone, tr. John B. Murdoch and ed. David Wyatt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Studies Pro-
gram, 1975), p. 124.
 19 Publicity Department, Khamplae Raigan khong Khana Kamamkan Kanpranom Farangset-Thai [Translation of the report of 
the Franco?Siamese Commission of Conciliation], Bangkok, 1947, p. 79.
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tiane was lost [during the French reoccupation], and the Lao Issara government moved to 
Nongkhai.20 
Tiang Sirikhan and other Free Thai members provided the Lao Issara with weapons to carry on their 
fight. Other assistance coming from Thailand can be inferred from a note dated 23 February 1946 
from Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Sinatyotharak to the Army, Navy and Air Force which stated that
In the fight for independence in the French territory of Laos, the groups fighting to regain inde-
pendence are asking for weapons and manpower from Thailand. The people of Laos and Thailand 
are not only of the same blood, but they also share a common border and cross back and forth in a 
mutual and intimate relationship. Therefore, out of sympathy it is possible as individuals to pro-
vide assistance. Each individual can, of course, use his own discretion when oﬀering assistance. 
Individuals can also hire themselves out to the Lao Issara. However, within the government, sol-
diers and civilian oﬃcials must remain neutral.21 
The gist of this note is that it was permissible for private individuals to assist the Lao Issara in their 
fight for independence, but people in government service had to maintain strict neutrality out of con-
sideration for Thailand?s foreign relations. But as will be shown later in this section, the Free Thai re-
gimes under Pridi?s leadership not only gave tacit approval to the activities of the Indochinese libera-
tion movements on Thai territory, but also covertly gave them active assistance. Pridi also used Tiang 
Sirikhan?s connections to have Wong Phonnikon,22 a Free Thai member from Nongkhai, dispatched as 
an economic advisor to the Issara government in Vientiane. Wong remained there until 24 April 1946, 
when the city fell to French forces. He left together with the principal members of the Issara regime 
who moved into exile in Thailand.23
As French forces gradually pressed in on Vientiane, from 24 March onward the number of Vietnam-
ese and other refugees fleeing across the river to Nongkhai increased rapidly. Pakon Angsusing, the 
Governor of Nongkhai, reported that ?according to the leader of the Vietnamese community, the num-
ber of Vietnamese moving into Nongkhai will reach 20 thousand.?24 Vietnamese evacuees from Laos 
in this period were called ?Yuan opphayop? (Vietnamese evacuees). On 24 April 1946, Vientiane finally 
fell, and the Lao Issara government moved to Nongkhai and then to Bangkok. Having retaken Laos, 
France eyed its next target: taking back the four provinces that Thailand had acquired in the territorial 
 20 Cremation Volume for Fong Sitthitham, pp. 50?55. 
 21 NAT, (3) So.Ro.0201.9/6.
 22 Born in 1919, Wong Phonnikon received an M.A. in Economics from Thammasat University and worked as a section chief in 
the Ministry of Commerce. He became an Under-Secretary in the Foreign Ministry in 1976, and in 1977 as Deputy Foreign 
Minister in the Kriangsak Cabinet, he improved Thailand?s relations with Vietnam.
 23 Wong Phonnikon interview.
 24 Report Ti.1396/2489 dated 29 Mar 1946, ?Immigration of Indochinese Inhabitants to Thailand,? from the Governor of 
Nongkhai to the Under-Secretary of Interior Ministry (NAT, So.Ro.0201.37.6/11).
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dispute with Indochina. As a result tension between Thailand and France quickly rose.
1.2?Support for Việt Minh
Information about the Việt Minh following the Japanese coup de force in March 1945 can be 
gleaned from Thai oﬃcial documents. One example is a report dated 14 March 1945 from Thawin 
Sunthonsanthun, the Governor of Nakhon Phanom, about the post-coup de force situation in Thakhek 
on the opposite bank of the Mekong. The report said:
The Japanese army is calling for the Lao and Vietnamese oﬃcials to return to their work places. 
They are presently appointing oﬃcials, but most of them are Vietnamese? I have heard from a 
number of reliable Vietnamese sources that the Vietnamese do not want to remain under either 
France or Japan. They are demanding independence. Thus they are not fighting to help the French 
drive out the Japanese. At the same time, however, it is doubtful that they would be able to achieve 
independence even if they co-operated with the Japanese. Therefore they are waiting for the sup-
port of China and the US, and they are waiting for the opportunity to do like French forces did 
when they rose up and drove out the Germans at the time the US landed on the Continent.25 
After Japan?s defeat, the Governors of Nakhon Phanom and Nongkhai sent in detailed reports on 
the movements of the Việt Minh on the Lao side of the river, but the reports did not use the term ?Việt 
Minh.? Instead they were referred to as the ?Yuan Issara? (Yuan being the Thai term for Vietnam/Viet-
namese) or simply as ?Vietnam [ese].? The first use of the term ?Việt Minh? in an oﬃcial Thai docu-
ment was in a message dated 17 December 1945 from the Governor of Battambang province to the 
Thai Interior Minister. In his message the Governor wrote:
I learned the following in a conversation with a number of Việt Minh committee members. 1) The 
Việt Minh are unchanged in their determination to win independence; they will fight against the 
French with absolute dauntlessness. They are inferior to the French in weaponry, but despite this 
inferiority, they will continue to fight a guerrilla war. 2) The Việt Minh will not negotiate with 
France as long as the French do not aﬃrm the principle of giving Vietnam independence. 3) The 
French Saigon radio station is broadcasting that the French have won and calm has largely re-
turned, but this is contrary to fact. Fierce fighting continues in any number of places, and the 
French have suﬀered heavy losses. 4) The Việt Minh have insuﬃcient funds and weapons. They 
have received some assistance from the Japanese army. The Thai border has jungle areas that are 
out of sight of the French, so they are asking for assistance from Thailand too. 5) The Việt Minh 
believe completely that they will succeed in their plan for independence. 6) This group [Việt 
 25 NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.98.1/19.
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Minh] adheres more to Russia and China than to the US or Britain. They detest the British. 7) The 
Việt Minh has closer, more co-operative relations with the Lao Issara than with the Khmer 
Issarak. Until now the Khmer thinking has been that upon achieving victory, the Yuan would take 
control of Cambodia; but now both sides have come to understand each other and have begun to 
co-operate. The Yuan are critical of the Khmer for their lack of strong leadership and firm spirit. 
They are fighting guerilla-type warfare in southern Vietnam and Cambodia. 8) After winning they 
[Việt Minh and Khmer] plan to declare each of their countries independent or form a confedera-
tion. 9) They [Việt Minh] have promised to provide us with intelligence on the French that is use-
ful to Thailand. 10) In the event of an unavoidable clash with the French, we may be able to re-
ceive assistance from this group [Việt Minh]. If we have the weapons, it would be good to provide 
them with these.26 
At that time Battambang was still under Thai government control, and the French were demanding 
its return. The noteworthy point in the Governor?s message was that should a clash with the French 
over the lost territories become unavoidable, the Thai could look to the Việt Minh for assistance, and 
in his opinion the Thai should help the Việt Minh by providing weapons. It needs to be remembered 
that Battambang at this time was a base area for the Việt Minh, and Trần Văn Giàu was a Việt Minh 
leader operating in the province. Such factors also likely influenced the Governor?s opinion.
Pridi Phanomyong did, in fact, supply the Việt Minh in Battambang with weapons. Many years later, 
in a 1973 recollection of that time immediately after the war, Pridi commented:
From the end of the war, the Vietnamese patriots came and asked us to supply them with weap-
ons. I gave them some of the Free Thai?s weapons. Luang Sangwonyutthakit, commander of the 
Military Police, had his MPs supervise the shipment of those weapons by rail to the border of Bat-
tambang which was Thai territory at that time. I received a letter of gratitude from Hồ Chí Minh 
in which he wrote that with those weapons they had been able to organize two battalions of patri-
otic military units, and to commemorate this, they had honored Siam27 by christening these units 
the ?Battalions from Siam.?28 
 26 NAT, So.Ro.0201.37.6/21; (3) So.Ro.0201.9/3, p. 48. The Cabinet Secretary, Thawi Bunyaket, reported this telegram to Prime 
Minister Seni Pramot on 19 December 1945.
 27 ?Siam? was Pridi?s preferred name for Thailand. During the time of the Free Thai regimes after the war when Pridi held sway, 
the country reverted to using the name ?Siam.? Following the November 1947 coup and the return of the military to power, 
the name was changed again to ?Thailand.?
 28 Cremation Volume for Rear Admiral Luang Sangwonyutthakit (in Thai), 1973, pp. 14?15. According to Suphot Dantrakul, the 
person in charge of shipping the weapons to the Việt Minh was Naval Lieutenant Phonglert Srisuknan (Author?s interview 
with Suphot Dantrakul, 6 Aug 1997). Pridi died in Paris in 1983, but on his behalf for his contribution to the recovery of Viet-
nam?s independence, the Vietnamese government on 30 August 1995 conferred upon his wife, Phunsuk, a medal of friend-
ship. On 14 October 1998 the government of Laos did likewise when they presented Phunsuk with a decoration of friendship. 
(Author?s interview with Wani Saipradit, daughter of Pridi and Phunsuk Phanomyong, 12 Oct. 1998).
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Pridi and the Free Thai regimes covertly but actively supported the Việt Minh, and after the war 
Thailand was the largest base outside of Indochina that the Việt Minh relied on. This came out clearly 
in a document dated 26 August 1947 that Foreign Minister Atthakit Phanomyong sent to the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary which reported on a tête-à-tête conversation that the Thai Consul General in Singa-
pore had with Nguyễn Ngọc, the Việt Minh public relations oﬃcial in the colony. The document re-
ported that according to Ngọc,
There are about 10 thousand phuak Vietnam [Vietnamese partisans, i.e. Việt Minh] in Vietnam. 
They want to express their appreciation for the secret co-operation and assistance from the King-
dom of Thailand. China is in the midst of a civil war, so the Việt Minh cannot rely on assistance 
from that country. The Việt Minh expect that the only country they will be able to rely on is Thai-
land. The Việt Minh are using the areas where they are living in Thailand as centers which Việt 
Minh throughout the world can contact.?29
The Consul General also reported that the Việt Minh in Singapore were receiving the co-operation 
and assistance of the Chinese Consulate General in that city.
On Bangkok?s Silom Road the Việt Minh set up the oﬃce of what was oﬃcially called the Vietnam 
Government Delegation to South East Asia.30 The precise date that this body was established is not 
known, but it was reported that the president of the delegation, Nguyễn Đức Quỳ, arrived in Bangkok 
and began operations in 194631; thus it can be inferred that the delegation was also established in 1946. 
At the same location as the delegation?s oﬃce, the Việt Minh set up the Vietnam News Service. They 
also set up a Thai?Vietnamese bilingual newspaper, Khaw Vietnam/Tin Việt Nam32 (Vietnam News) 
which began publishing in Bangkok on 23 June 1946.
2.?Returning the Four Provinces to France
Like the Phibun government that had acquired the territories, the Pridi-dominated Free Thai gov-
ernments that took control of Thailand after July 1944 regarded the two provinces in Laos and the two 
in Cambodia that had been recovered from French-Indochina in 1941 as belonging rightfully to Thai-
land. In July 1945 under the premiership of Khuang Aphaiwong, elections for the Thai House of Rep-
resentatives were held for the first time in the four provinces. Elections were held again in January 
1946 during Seni Pramot?s term as Prime Minister, and they were held again in August 1946 while Pri-
di himself was Prime Minister. One reason for holding these elections was to demonstrate to the Unit-
ed Nations that government in the four provinces was being conducted based on the popular will of 
 29 NAT, So.Ro.0201.9.3/32.
 30 NAT, So.Ro.2021.37.6/11.
 31 Ibid.
 32 The paper?s publisher was ?Sutchai Charoenchat,? the Thai name of Trần Văn Giàu, who also went by the name of Bamrung 
Charoenchat.
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the people, which gave Bangkok grounds for rejecting French demands for their return.
With the conclusion of the Treaty of Tokyo on 9 May 1941, peaceful relations had been restored be-
tween the Thai and Vichy French governments, and diplomatic relations between the two countries re-
mained peaceful for the duration of the war. But after the war the De Gaulle government refused to 
recognize the Vichy interregnum. It argued that the state of hostilities between Thailand and 
French-Indochina since their border dispute still continued, and with much indignation demanded 
that Thailand return the Indochinese territories that it was occupying. The British were in complete 
support of France?s demands.33 In September 1945 Bangkok sent a representative to Kandy, Ceylon to 
discuss the termination of the state of war between Britain and Thailand. At that time the French rep-
resentative met the Thai representative and presented him with an oﬃcial document that the French 
requested be delivered to Pridi Phanomyong, the Regent for the young King Ananda Mahidol. The 
document stated that ?France regards a state of hostility as still existing between itself and Thailand. 
France is ready to discuss the restoration of relations based on the principle of a return to conditions 
prior to June 1940.? The French representative told his Thai counterpart that France was demanding 
the retrocession of the territories that Thailand had gained in 1941 and also the return of the Emerald 
Buddha. (The Thai had brought this statue to Bangkok from Vientiane following a military campaign 
in Laos in the late 18th century. It is regarded as the guardian Buddha of the Thai state and plays a vital 
role in the rituals and functions of the Thai royal house but is viewed by many Lao as rightfully theirs). 
The first demand had been expected, but the latter was completely out of the blue, and the Thai gov-
ernment did not even give it serious consideration.34
The French were not alone in demanding that the territorial situation be returned to its prewar con-
dition; the British and Americans were demanding the same. Lacking any support for their position, 
the Thai realized soon after the war ended that they could not continue to reject the demands to give 
back the territories. But they also saw that negotiating a settlement directly with the French would 
simply mean returning all of the disputed territories back to colonial rule. Therefore the Thai sought to 
follow another approach which they hoped would bring a solution to the colonial problem, namely to 
bring the territorial issue before the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the UN Char-
ter. In order for Thailand to join the United Nations, it needed the approval of France which was a per-
manent member of the Security Council, but it could not get this approval until the territorial issue 
had been settled.35 However, the Charter also contained provisions that allowed non-member states to 
 33 Foreign Minister Direk Chainam?s explanation to the National Assembly on 14 October 1946 (Raingan Kanprachum Rua-
mkan khong Ratthasapha Pho. So. 2489?90 [Proceedings of the 1946?1947 Sessions of the Joint Sittings of the National As-
sembly] [henceforth Raingan 2489?90], p. 190).
 34 Foreign Minister Direk Chainam?s explanation to the National Assembly on 17 June 1946 (ibid., pp. 82?84). It would seem 
that the demand for the Emerald Buddha was a negotiating tactic on the part of the French and not a serious demand. Had it 
been fulfilled, it would have had a dramatic eﬀect of alienating the Thai from the Laos and of impressing the Lao people with 
the power of France. Probably because of strong Thai objections, this demand was never presented again.
 35 The UN General Assembly approved Thailand?s membership on 15 December 1946 following the conclusion of the territorial 
dispute with the Franco?Siamese Agreement of Settlement.
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bring appeals before the United Nations.
By appealing to the UN, the Thai were hoping for several things. Were the international body to de-
cide to return the territories to France, the Thai leadership had less to fear from a strong unpopular 
domestic reaction because it would have been a decision made by the UN. But there was the hope that 
the UN might decide to apply the Charter?s principle of self-determination to the territories, which 
would then put the issue to a vote of the local inhabitants. This oﬀered the chance of a vote to remain 
with Thailand. But even if the vote were against staying with Thailand?if it were one for indepen-
dence?this would be a demand for the end of colonial rule in Indochina which had been Thailand?s 
noble cause since its territorial dispute with Indochina and which the people of Thailand supported.
An indication that the leadership was following this line of thought came in an explanation from 
Pridi, now Prime Minister, to the National Assembly on 17 June 1946:
We began by declaring peace on 16 Aug.1945 and trying to get them to recognize that we had no 
responsibility for the war. They strongly demanded that we declare our stance on the territories, so 
the Khuang government came to me; I was then Regent; and asked me for permission to make a 
declaration. We then declared that we would accept the judgment of the United Nations. In nego-
tiations with the British in Singapore for an agreement to terminate the war, when the agreement 
was concluded, the British said clearly in the document that they did not recognize Thailand?s 
claim because the territories had been obtained using the power of an Axis country. We made all 
possible eﬀort to have this issue referred to an international organization. Our intention was not 
just to have the four provinces but to have all of the territories that France had taken away from us 
referred to an international organization for judgment.36 
While the French were demanding direct negotiations, the Thai were attempting to prolong the situ-
ation. On 27 December 1945 Prime Minister Seni Pramot presented a plan to Charlie Yost, the Ameri-
can Chargé d?Aﬀaires. The plan said that the Thai government would declare that it had had nothing to 
do with the territories that Phibun had acquired by co-operating with the Japanese, and would request 
that the territories in question be put under provisional international control. Seni asked Yost whether 
or not the US would agree. In response to France?s demands for negotiations, on 2 April 1946 the Pridi 
government dispatched a delegation to Saigon to hold working-level consultations. The Thai put for-
ward three proposals and asked the French to make a choice: 1) take the issue to the United Nations; 2) 
put it to a vote of the local inhabitants; 3) Thailand would temporarily give back the territories, but in 
return for rice that Thailand would provide to France, the French would then permanently retrocede 
the territories to Thailand. The French rejected all three options.37
 36 Raingan 2489?90, pp. 104?105 (emphasis added).
 37 Konthi Suphamongkhon, Kanwithesobai khong Thai Pho. So. 2483?2495 [Thai Foreign Policy, 1940?1952] (Bangkok, Tham-
masat, 1994), pp. 271?74.
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On 24 April 1946 Vientiane fell to French forces, and the Lao Issara government fled to Thailand. 
After recapturing Laos, tensions between Thailand and France rose quickly as the French military eyed 
their next target: the four Thai provinces that had been part of Indochina. On 6 and 7 April French 
forces made attacks on Nakhon Phanom. Then on the 26th up to two companies of French troops 
crossed the Mekong and occupied Tha Bo district in Nongkhai province for several hours (It should be 
noted that neither Nakhon Phanom nor Nongkhai were part of the disputed territories taken from In-
dochina). Calling these incidents a grave violation of Thai sovereignty, the Bangkok government held 
consultations with the British Minister and the American Chargé d?Aﬀaires. Pridi sent telegrams to the 
four permanent members of the UN Security Council (excluding France) appealing for their support. 
He also sent a telegram to Herbert Hoover, the former US President who was head of the World Food 
Procurement Organization, telling him that France?s actions would aﬀect Thailand?s ability to supply 
the rice that it was required to provide to the world.38
Pridi then made the decision to use these incidents for an appeal to the UN under the provisions of 
Article 35, Clause 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which stated that ?a state which is not a 
Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General 
Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the 
obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.? Under the assumption that accepting 
?the obligations of pacific settlement? as required by the UN Charter would entail a change of territory, 
the Pridi cabinet on 17 June asked a joint meeting of both National Assembly chambers to approve the 
government?s proposal of bringing the issue before the United Nations. This was approved by a vote of 
122 to 4. The Prime Minister then called for everyone?s support, telling the Assembly, ?this problem is 
the whole country?s problem. It is not the government?s problem or the opposition party?s problem. So 
I also want Khuang, the leader of the opposition party, to participate in the negotiations for appealing 
to the UN.?39 Khuang, the former Prime Minister, responded by accepting to be the deputy leader of 
the government?s delegation; Prince Wan Waithayakon was appointed leader.
On 3 August 1946, as the Thai delegation to the UN was preparing to depart, the American Minister 
to Thailand came to Pridi with a French proposal that had come via the US State Department. The 
French government wanted to ask the International Court of Justice to judge whether or not the 9 May 
1941 Treaty of Tokyo and Thailand?s acquisition of Indochinese territory had been legally valid, and 
therefore the French wanted the Thai to withdraw their appeal to the UN. The opinion of the US State 
Department was that the French proposal was not a matter for Thailand and France to settle just be-
tween themselves; it fell within the UN?s framework for settling disputes, which was what Thailand 
wanted; therefore the US asked Thailand to accept the French proposal. The Thai government and the 
delegation to the UN studied the proposal as well as the accompanying Department of State opinion 
 38 Foreign Minister Direk Chainam?s explanation to the National Assembly on 13 June 1946 (Raingan 2489?90, pp. 21?24).
 39 Ibid., pp. 104?105. In April 1946 Khuang and former Prime Minister Seni Pramot formed the Democratic Party in opposition 
to Pridi?s Cabinet.
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and decided to accept.
The Bangkok government gave the delegation all powers to carry on activities at the International 
Court of Justice,40 which was an organization belonging to the United Nations. Just at that time, how-
ever, on 7 August 1946 attacks by Khmer Issarak revolutionaries occurred in the Cambodian province 
of Siem Reap.41 The French accused Thai of crossing the border illegally and participating in the at-
tacks and claimed that armed units trained by the Thai government had also been involved. The 
French reacted by unilaterally withdrawing its proposal to seek settlement at the International Court of 
Justice. After arriving in the US the Thai delegation at the end of August discussed a course of action 
with the American government, but the Deputy Secretary of State told Prince Wan that since the 
French had unilaterally withdrawn their proposal, there was nothing more the US could do, and he ad-
vised the Thai to enter into direct negotiations with the French. The French dispatched G. Georges Pi-
cot, who had been the French Chargé d?Aﬀaires in Thailand in 1937. He entered into informal negotia-
tions with the Thai delegation asking that a Thai representative visit France. It was decided that 
Khuang would visit France on 7 September 1946.42
In Paris the French government handed to Khuang a new proposal to be the basis for the direct ne-
gotiations between the two countries. At the same time the proposal was sent via the US State Depart-
ment to Prince Wan and the Thai delegation. The essential points of the proposal were that:
1) Thailand would recognize the invalidity of the 9 May 1941 Treaty of Tokyo and turn over the In-
dochina territories to French control so that France could transfer them to the Cambodian and Lao 
governments;
2) the status quo would be restored; the formerly existing diplomatic relations would be 
re-established after the state of war between France and Thailand had been settled; and the 7 Decem-
ber 1937 treaty of friendship, trade and navigation would be applied in relations between the two 
countries; Thailand would withdraw its appeal to the UN Security Council, and France for its part 
would not oppose Thailand?s entry into the United Nations,
3) Thailand would declare the invalidity of the Treaty of Tokyo; at the same time France would ap-
prove the establishment of a Commission of Conciliation (composed of one member from each of the 
interested countries and three members from neutral countries forming a total of five members) in ac-
cordance with the General Protocol for the Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes adopted on 
26 September 1928 by the General Assembly of the League of Nations and which was set forth in Arti-
cle 21 of the 1937 treaty of friendship, trade and navigation. The Commission of Conciliation would 
 40 Ibid., pp. 187?188.
 41 The Thai Governor of Phibunsongkhram province reported that on 7 August 1946 the Khmer Issarak attempted to start a 
revolution in the Cambodian province of Siem Reap. They opened jails and gave weapons to the political prisoners. (NAT, (3) 
So.Ro.0201.9/3, p. 131).
 42 Foreign Minister Direk Chainam?s explanation to the National Assembly on 14 October 1946, Raingan 2489?90, pp. 186?91; 
also M.R. Nopphakaew Nawarat, Si Changwat Daen Phipat [The four contested provinces] (Bangkok: Warasap, 1946), pp. 28?
39.
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start working immediately after the territories had been returned to Indochina. It would examine and 
consider on ethnic, geographical and economic grounds the arguments of both concerned parties as to 
whether the stipulations concerning territory in the 23 March 1907 Franco?Siamese treaty (which had 
made the final adjustments to the border between Siam and French Indochina) should be revised or 
left unchanged.
On 4 October 1946 the Department of State sent a memorandum to the Thai delegation saying that 
the US government could not recognize the territories that Bangkok had acquired from Indochina in 
1941, that Thailand should restore the status quo ante, and that the US supported the French proposal. 
But the memorandum also said that Washington ?has consistently requested of the French government 
that when Thailand has returned the territories, the French government promise to give Thailand the 
opportunity to ask for the peaceful revision of the border or transfer of territorial jurisdiction.? This 
suggested that US pressure was also behind the French proposal for examining the ethnic, geographic 
and economic aspects of the issue, and this suggestion gave the Thai hope for a future re-retrocession 
of territory. The consensus of the delegation was that even the most concerted Thai eﬀort to appeal to 
the Security Council would be vetoed by the French; and if by some remote chance France did yield to 
a majority, it would sour relations between Paris and Bangkok for a long time to come. Meanwhile, 
Britain and the US, the two great powers on whom the Thai had hoped to rely on for support, were 
asking Thailand to negotiate directly with the French and were not supporting an appeal to the Securi-
ty Council. Thailand could hardly consider seeking the support of the Soviet Union with whom it still 
had no diplomatic relations. All in all, Thailand could not hope to gain the support of a majority in the 
Security Council.43 Faced with these stark conclusions, Thailand?s strategy to avoid direct negotiations 
with France and bring the territorial issue before the United Nations ended in failure.
In August 1946 Thamrong Nawasawat replaced Pridi as Prime Minister. On 13 October Thamrong 
opened a Cabinet meeting which he had asked Pridi, who now held the oﬃcial status of Elder States-
man, to attend. With the British and Americans supporting the French proposal, the Cabinet decided 
to follow a policy approach that was in basic agreement with it.44 During his negotiations in France, 
Khuang had gained a sense that after Thailand had given back the territories, there was the possibility 
that the Battambang area would be returned once again to Thailand. It was possible that the US would 
assist in this second return. Putting its trust in this small ray of hope,45 the Cabinet decided that on the 
territorial issue, Thailand would follow the course set by the US.
The Cabinet?s policy decision was discussed in the National Assembly on 14 and 15 October. During 
those two days of debate indignation and outrage poured out: the postwar French government insisted 
that the 1941 Treaty of Tokyo was invalid because Paris refused to legitimize the Vichy government 
 43 Foreign Minister Direk Chainam?s explanation to the National Assembly on 14 October 1946. Raingan 2489?90, pp. 191?97.
 44 Konthi, Kanwithesobai khong Thai, p. 306.
 45 Prime Minister Thamrong Nawasawat?s statements to the National Assembly on 12 August 1947 (Raingan 2489?90, pp. 474?
76, 482?483). In response to a question from an MP, Thamrong said, ?in fact, I thought that we could get back at least two or 
three of the four provinces.?
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that even the United States had recognized in 1941; even though France was the first country to be de-
feated in the war, it had secured a permanent seat on the UN Security Council after the war and was 
using that position to block Thailand?s eﬀorts to join the UN by linking it with their demands for terri-
torial adjustments; the one million people living in the four provinces would return to being slaves of 
the French. Such was the anger and resentment of the Assembly members. Prime Minister Thamrong 
told the assembly that in keeping with the pacifistic spirit of the United Nations, Thailand was seeking 
a peaceful solution and would not get into a war with France. He expressed confidence that with US 
support Thailand would be able to reacquire a portion of the territories.
Direk Chainam, the Foreign Minister, stated that the thinking of all the postwar cabinets of the Free 
Thai government was to honor the return of the territories to France; nothing more was being de-
manded of Thailand than to return those territories. Direk went on to say that after returning the terri-
tories to France, it was also possible that with US help Thailand would be able to get back again even 
more territory than what it had just returned to France. He then made clear his fear that since Britain 
and the US did not recognize the territories as belonging to Thailand, if Bangkok continued to refuse 
to return them, it was possible that French forces would invade the four provinces. Former Prime Min-
ister Seni Pramot of the opposition Democratic Party concurred, saying that as a small country, Thai-
land had no choice but to rely on Britain and the US, the two great powers. He believed that if Thai-
land did not act contrary to the US and entrusted the handling of the situation to the Americans, 
things would end well for Thailand. If Thailand opposed Britain and the US, it would suﬀer great ad-
verse eﬀects; so he agreed with the government?s policy decision to follow the course set by Britain and 
the United States.46 However, another member of the opposition, So Sethaputra, proposed that another 
idea would be to appeal to the UN for the self-determination of the people living in the four provinces, 
or else Thailand could unilaterally declare the independence of the Lao and Khmer people in the four 
provinces. Direk opposed this, saying that if Thailand declared it was going to give them indepen-
dence, it would become isolated internationally.47 It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the 
Thai leadership at this time had shifted toward relying on the US in the hope of reacquiring some por-
tion of the territories, and that the new policy approach was also against overtly expressing support for 
Lao and Khmer independence. On 15 October 1946, by a vote of 91 to 29, the National Assembly ap-
proved the government?s policy proposal.
On 17 November the Franco?Siamese Agreement of Settlement was signed in Washington. This 
agreement contained the Thai demand that an international Commission of Conciliation reexamine 
and determine on ethnic, geographical and economic grounds whether to revise or leave unchanged 
the national borders not only for the territory that Thailand had ceded to France in the treaty of 1907 
 46 Raingan 2489?90, pp. 255?85. When Foreign Minister Direk gave a speech laying out the policy of the newly installed Tham-
rong cabinet to a joint sitting of both houses of the National Assembly on 26 August 1946, he told the assembly that ?there 
has never been another time when the amicable relations between Britain, the US and Thailand have been better than during 
these past three months.? (p. 146).
 47 Ibid., pp. 309?11.
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(the western region of Cambodia retroceded to Bangkok by the 1941 Treaty of Tokyo, which became 
the two Thai provinces of Battambang and Phibunsongkhram), but also the borders related to the 1893 
treaty (when Thailand ceded the whole of Laos on the left bank of the Mekong River) and the 1904 
treaty (when territories on the right bank of the Mekong were ceded to French-controlled Laos and 
which Thailand also reclaimed in the Treaty of Tokyo, organizing them into the provinces of Lan 
Chang and Sayaburi). However in essence, the agreement was the same as the original French proposal.
On 19 November a mass gathering took place sponsored by the Bangkok Samlaw (Trishaw) Union 
to protest the seizure of Thai territory by the French colonialists. Wat Sunthonjamon, representing the 
Thai Communist Party, protested the return of the territories to France.48 On the 25th the joint com-
mittee arrived for the transfer of the territories, and in an amicable atmosphere under the monitoring 
of British and American observers, the handover was completed on 5 December. Five days earlier, in 
the afternoon of 1 December, Việt Minh pamphlets containing threats against the French were scat-
tered around the Battambang marketplace, but there was no major disturbance.49 By 8 December all 
four provinces had been formally returned to the French.
3.?The International Commission of Conciliation and the Southeast Asian League
The five-member International Commission of Conciliation, with three neutral members from the 
US, Britain and Peru; plus one each from France and Thailand (whose member was Prince Wan 
Waithayakon, Thai Ambassador to the US), began working on 5 May 1947 in Washington. The Thai 
government appointed Prince Sakon, Prince Wan?s older brother, as its agent before the commission; 
Prince Sakon?s deputy was the influential political leader, Tiang Sirikhan. On 12 May Prince Sakon 
submitted Thailand?s request to the Commission; the French presented their remarks on the 22nd; the 
Thai responded to the French remarks with a written rebuttal submitted on 29 May. Soon after the 
Commission of Conciliation had begun working, Prime Minister Thamrong dispatched Pridito Wash-
ington at the request of Prince Sakon and Tiang Sirikhan to help with the negotiations. Pridi remained 
in Washington from 10 May until 2 June, thus he must have had an important hand in drawing up 
Thailand?s initial 12 May request and its 29 May rebuttal.
According to the commentary of the Thai Publicity Department, Thailand?s written rebuttal stated 
that:
France talks about the possibility of Laos and Cambodia making a reverse demand on Thailand 
for territories, but the Thai government is not against conducting negotiations with a free and in-
dependent Laos and Cambodia. The Thai government would welcome the addition of Laos and 
Cambodia to the family of nations? If changes come about in accordance with the requests that 
 48 Damri Ruangsutham, Panyachon Pathiwat khong Chonchan Kammakon Thai: Roi Tamruat Ek Wat Sunthonjamon (Pol. Lieu-
tenant Wat Sunthonjamon: Revolutionary intellectual of the Thai working class) (Bangkok, 1998), p. 8. 
 49 NAT, So.Ro.0201.35/47.
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Thailand is making, then the people of the territories at issue who presently are demanding the re-
alization of their hopes [meaning the Khmer and Laos who are involved in independence move-
ments] will come to enjoy all aspects of political, social and economic freedom and lead a free and 
democratic way of life. With this way of life, all the people will be able to exercise the same rights 
regardless of creed, social standing, language or religion, and receive equal protection. They will 
also participate in governing their own countries? Despite being an extremely close community, 
the peoples on both sides of the Mekong River have been separated by that river since 1893 in 
contradiction to what is reasonable ethnically, geographically and economically, as well as being 
contrary to what is humane. But the peoples on both sides of the Mekong will come together once 
again, and peace, prosperity and happiness will likewise return once again...If the members of the 
Commission of Conciliation would like to visit the territories themselves to confirm these things 
with their own eyes, the Thai agent is ready to welcome them. France says that if Laos and Thai-
land were to unite, Laos would be in danger of extinction, but this is contrary to reality as well as 
against the opinions rightfully expressed by the people of the territories at issue. The Thai govern-
ment agent is confident that if the people of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam were given the oppor-
tunity to express their opinions in a referendum, they would make clear their true thoughts and 
inclinations? Thailand has no intention of bringing the people in the territories at issue under its 
rule. It only wishes for them to enjoy freedom and the other rights of democracy. Thailand has no 
ambition to expand its territory...Thailand?s request arises from its genuine desire to bring stability 
to this part of the world, from its noble intention to support the inhabitants of the territories at is-
sue in realizing the principles of liberty and democracy which they have never experienced before. 
Therefore Thailand asks the Commission of Conciliation to accept its request. Social harmony 
comes forth only with the advance toward democracy. Good government is impossible within the 
framework of colonialism. Thailand and its government value this fact and adhere to the principle 
of liberty and national self-determination as a human right.?50
In its written rebuttal the Thai government stressed the value and importance of liberty, democracy 
and national self-determination and clearly supported the complete independence of Laos, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam from French control. The rebuttal also made clear the government?s hope that after Laos 
gained its independence, it would of its own volition become a member of the ?Thai democratic com-
munity,? or else would form a confederation with Thailand. Heretofore the Thai government had re-
frained from expressing full-fledged support for Indochina?s independence not only because it sought 
the re-retrocession of its territories but also out of diplomatic considerations. However, the emphasis 
that the 29 May Thai rebuttal put on Indochina?s independence represented a departure from this poli-
cy.
 50 Publicity Department, Khamplae Raigan, pp. 63?78 (emphasis added).
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On 27 June 1947 the Commission of Conciliation decided on recommendations that would main-
tain the existing status quo and not change any borders or territories. In reaching this decision the 
Commission had excluded any political or historic considerations, had given no regard at all to Thai-
land?s arguments against colonialism and for protecting liberty and democracy, and had dismissed 
Thailand?s claims saying that the ethnic, geographic and economic arguments that the Thai had pre-
sented lacked suﬃcient persuasiveness. Explaining to the National Assembly on 12 August the reason 
for an outcome that completely betrayed Thai hopes for a return of territory, the Thamrong cabinet 
stated:
We believe it was because from the start of our resort to conciliation, political considerations were 
at work which we had not expected. The great powers sympathized with our small country of 
Thailand only to the extent that it did not conflict with their national interests. It is true that at the 
time of the signing of the Franco?Siamese Agreement of Settlement, the great powers sympa-
thized with Thailand. However, a conflict arose between their sympathy toward Thailand and oth-
er greater policy considerations, and the great powers chose to give their support to France?If 
France were ready to give Laos and Cambodia their independence, what sort of confederation (sa-
haphan) they joined would be a matter for an independent Laos and Cambodia to decide for 
themselves?Were France to propose granting them independence, then our delegate to the Com-
mission of Conciliation had been instructed to support it.51 
This explanation drew criticism from Khuang Aphaiwong, leader of the opposition Democratic Par-
ty. He had been the deputy leader of the Thai delegation to the negotiations of the Franco?Siamese 
agreement in the summer of 1946 and had gone to Paris that September, where he had gained the 
sense that France would retrocede a portion of the territories back to Thailand. But he was critical of 
the government because the Thai delegate on the Commission had paid scant attention to getting back 
the four provinces, and instead had engaged in grand talk, bringing up issues of independence for 
neighboring countries and a league of Southeast Asian nations. Such talk hardened France?s attitude 
with the result that Bangkok was unable to obtain what it should have obtained.52 Khuang had been 
Prime Minister during the final months of World War II, and his flexible, compromising approach to 
diplomacy had ameliorated Thai relations with Japan and had succeeded in avoiding a Japanese coup 
 51 Raingan 2489?90, p. 509.
 52 Ibid., p. 460. Khuang repeatedly criticized the government for its approach to the negotiations. On 5 November 1947 in the 
House of Representatives he said, ?You should only write the things that Thailand is demanding. The government?s policy 
should not be concerned with their [Indochina?s] struggle. The struggle in Vietnam and those places is a problem for the UN 
and not something that we should be involved in. It would be better for Thailand to keep in mind its status as a small coun-
try.? (Raingan 2490, p. 3183). ?Wouldn?t it have been better to talk with France about the lost territories first, and after that 
about independence and the far east union [i.e., the Southeast Asian League] Thailand lost because it didn?t argue for the re-
turn of the territories which should have been its immediate concern and instead took up the issue of other countries? inde-
pendence which should not have been its immediate concern.? (pp. 3187?89).
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de force which had been French Indochina?s fate. From his experience he looked upon Pridi?s approach 
to diplomacy as ignoring the limited status of Thailand as a small country and the pursuit of ideals in 
an excessively dogmatic and heedless manner that made France uneasy about its position in the nego-
tiations.
Responding to Khuang?s criticism, Tiang Sirikhan, the Thai government?s deputy delegate to the 
Commission of Conciliation, explained that
Although Thailand had not made any reference to Laos or Cambodia in its request, France in its 
remarks of 22 May stated that it was fighting for the independence of Laos and Cambodia. It had 
not been Thailand?s intention to speak about the matter of Laos and Cambodia as it was a political 
issue and outside of the Commission of Conciliation?s scope of consideration. But the French 
brought it up, so the Thai side said that if France gave them independence, Thailand would not ask 
for territory; and we also proposed holding a referendum of the local inhabitants.53 
The issue of Indochina?s independence that the Thai delegate brought up was largely as Tiang 
Sirikhan explained, but Pridi and the Thamrong Cabinet had already made the assumption that the 
Commission would not approve of the retrocession of territory back to Thailand, and one way to cope 
with this outcome, one which domestic Thai public opinion would also support, was to bring the inde-
pendence of Indochina including the four provinces once again before the United Nations and seek the 
judgment of that organization based on the principle of self-determination. As noted earlier, Thai-
land?s leadership after the war was troubled by the incompatibility of their twin demands of calling for 
Indochina?s independence while at the same time seeking to hold onto territory taken back from Cam-
bodia and Laos. However, if there were no possibility of getting the lost territories back again, their di-
lemma would be resolved. They would be unencumbered in pursuing a policy of independence for the 
countries of Indochina. But since these countries together with Thailand were small weak nations, Pri-
di and the Thai leadership around him felt that it was essential for them all to join together in forming 
a league, or perhaps an association (sahaphan was Pridi?s Thai term), to preserve the peace and pro-
mote the economic development of the region. In other words, Pridi and his government supporters 
saw the independence of the Indochinese states and their inclusion along with Thailand in a regional 
association as being two parts of a single inseparable undertaking.
Pridi talked about his sahaphan concept, which he dubbed the ?Southeast Asian League,?54 in his 2 
 53 Raingan 2489?90, pp. 520?21.
 54 This is its most frequent rendering in English; in his 2 July 1947 report, Pridi?s Thai phrasing was Sahaphan rawang Prathet 
nai Phak Echia Buraphatai (Association among Countries in the Southeast Asian Region). In his 1972 reminiscences which 
he wrote in French (see reference in note 56), Pridi called it l?Association des Nations Unies de l?Asie du Sud-est. The Bangkok 
Post, which carried an English translation of his reminiscences, rendered this as the ?Southeast Asian United Nations? Associ-
ation? (28 Nov. 1974). Even in 1947 after the inception of the organization, its appellation in Thai as well as English remained 
uncertain. Khuang made the comment in the National Assembly on 12 August 1947 that ?the French are against the sahaphap 
[union]? (Raingan 2489?90, p. 518). On 6 November of the same year at a press conference, Prime Minister Thamrong called 
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July 1947 report to the Prime Minister after returning from Washington. In the report Pridi explained:
1)  Many of the leaders and political people of the countries in the region have the following opin-
ion. The countries in the region are presently separated and dispersed, but if they were to form 
a league, with the region?s abundance of natural resources, the economies of each of the coun-
tries would improve. This would bring about peace and happiness for the people of the region, 
and in turn would contribute to the world?s economy and to world peace and stability. 
2)  Numerous European and American comrades of mine in the anti-Japanese movement have ad-
vocated the idea of a league; and Thailand?s anti-Japanese organization is not just made up of 
Thai, it also has sections made up of other Asian peoples.
3)  After the war ended numerous European and American journalists and [Indochinese?] politi-
cal leaders visited me while passing through Thailand carrying letters entrusted to them and 
addressed to me from numerous leaders and political people. In these letters the writers ex-
pressed their hopes for the foundation of a league. All of the letters said that because Thailand 
is centrally located among the diﬀerent countries and had preserved its independence, Bangkok 
should be the capital [Nakhon luang] of the league when it is formed.
4)  The idea of setting up a league is also widespread in foreign countries, and in numerous locali-
ties associations [samakhom] supported by the local people have started to be organized.55 
In his 1972 reminiscences Pridi wrote:
Among the old Southeast Asian friends who have visited me since my arrival in Paris in 1970, 
some of them have expressed their nostalgia for our Southeast Asian League which we created af-
ter the Japanese surrender and dissolved in 1947 at the time of the reactionary coup d?état in Siam. 
The reactionaries contradicted themselves in their accusations against this organization for some 
thought it was a Southeast Asian communist league, while others confused it with the Pan-Thai 
Union planned by Marshal Phibun in order to unify the people of the Thai race in China, India 
and Southeast Asia with a view to creating a great Thai Empire under the dictatorship of Marshal 
Phibun himself?It must be remembered that before the Second World War only Siam, among the 
Southeast Asian countries, was nominally independent?A certain number of patriots from these 
colonized countries of various political and ideological persuasions had clandestinely taken refuge 
in Siam?I am sympathetic towards all patriotic refugees with whom I have become acquainted 
and make no ideological distinction, for each is free to choose his own way. During the Second 
World War the Japanese occupied the whole of Southeast Asia. In order to get the support of the 
native populations of the colonized countries, Japan helped the local patriots to form so-called in-
it ?Sahaphap Echia Tawanok Chiengtai? [Southeast Asian union] (NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.92.1/10).
 55 NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.25/47.
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dependent governments?As for the other patriots from the Southeast Asian countries who were 
in Siam, a good number of them joined our [Seri Thai] resistance movement against the Japanese. 
They were instructed in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare by our movement, and were 
also trained by American and British military oﬃcers whose primary objective was to defeat Ja-
pan. However after the Japanese surrender, the former Western colonists returned to take back 
their former colonies. They encountered resistance from the local patriots. A certain number of 
these patriots came to Siam to seek our help. During the conversations I had with these patriots, 
we came to the conclusion that all the countries in Southeast Asia would, through their own ef-
forts, become independent in the near future. But each one of us would have to confront two gi-
ants: Nationalist China which had emerged after the victory over Japan, and India now indepen-
dent of the British Empire. If after achieving independence all these countries lived separately in 
isolation, it would be diﬃcult for them to defend themselves against any threats from these two 
giants. Consequently it would be necessary to establish an association of the countries in South-
east Asia for mutual defense. This organization was not to be a federation or a confederation of 
member states, for each nation was fully independent both in its domestic and foreign aﬀairs. It 
was simply an ?entente cordiale? between member states. In order that the association might be ac-
cepted by all the peoples of the region, it was necessary for it to start oﬀ as a popular organization. 
As Siam is situated in the center of the region it was natural that the association?s headquarters 
should be set up there. I therefore agreed that Bangkok, our capital, should be the headquarters of 
the initial core of the organization by putting at its disposal a building and some necessary funds. 
Many patriots from the Southeast Asian countries joined the association?The association was not 
a communist league, for its members were made up of patriots of all persuasions and included 
Prince Phetsarath, former Viceroy of Laos.?56
A shift of international perception can be seen between Pridi?s July 1947 report and his 1972 remi-
 56 ?The Pridi Banomyong Story,? Bangkok Post, 28 Nov. 1974 or Pridi Banomyong, Ma vie mouvementée et mes 21 ans d?exil en 
Chine Populaire (Paris: UNESCON, 1972), pp. 71?5. In the quote Pridi wrote that there were people who got confused be-
tween himself and Phibun, but this would indicate that the thinking of the two men and their supporters concerning the In-
dochinese territories and Indochina liberation was largely alike. Both sides were part of the same political current, had a 
shared history and continuity; and there were only small diﬀerences in their political views. Wong Phonnikon wrote that Pri-
di lent his support to a conference of political leaders from Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia that was held in Bang-
kok around 23 July 1947; Wong Phonnikon, Nayobai Tangprathet thi Phung Prathana lae Naewkhwamkhit khong Than Pridi 
Phanomyong [A desirable diplomatic policy and Pridi Phanomyong?s thought] (Bangkok: Khana Kammakan Damnoen Ngan 
Chalong 100 pi Chattakan Nai Pridi Phanomyong Ratthaburut Awuso, 1999), p. 24. This conference issued a Bangkok decla-
ration saying that they would stand united in their fight against the return of the colonial powers. Mahachon, the oﬃcial or-
gan of the Thai Communist Party, reported that the Southeast Asian League (Sannibat Echia Akkhane) was established on 8 
September 1947 in Bangkok by representatives from five countries (Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos). The 
purpose of the League was to promote friendship and understanding among nations in Southeast Asia, to co-operate with 
each other in the fight for independence, and to promote peace and the welfare of the people (Mahachon, No. 105, 14 Sept. 
1947, p. 6); see also Christopher E. Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885?
1954 (Richmond: Curzon, 1999), pp. 256?65.
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niscence, but it can be seen that the idea of a Southeast Asian League originated from Pridi?s own idea 
of a region-wide economic sphere (which he had first set forth in his economic plan proposed in 1933 
following the constitutional revolution) and from his experience in organizing a anti-Japanese move-
ment during the war whose membership was composed of people from the nations of Indochina. The 
league received the support of Indochinese leaders that included the Việt Minh, whose delegation to 
Southeast Asia had its oﬃce in Bangkok; the Lao Issara government in exile, which had fled to Bang-
kok from Vientiane in April 194657; and the leaders of the Khmer Issarak.58
On 25 April 1947, prior to the start of the Commission of Conciliation, the French showed Prince 
Wan their idea for an Indochina confederation that they called the Pan Union,59 which they hoped 
would get the Thai to withdraw their territorial demands. Prince Wan immediately informed Bangkok 
of the French proposal,60 and Pridi, who was preparing to visit the US, was also informed of it. This 
move by the French meant that there were now two ideas in the works for an association of Indochi-
nese states. There are no details of the discussions between Prime Minister Thamrong and Pridi before 
his departure for the US, but both men knew that getting a re-retrocession of territory was going to be 
a diﬃcult task. However, they held out the hope of getting US support, and presumably they were 
hopeful that the French proposal of a union would contain benefits for Thailand. While in Washington 
assisting with the conciliation talks and then in Paris, Pridi searched for ways to adjust his concept of a 
league to the French plan for a union. The amount of eﬀort he put into this endeavor can be inferred 
from the title that he put on his final report to the Prime Minister: ?The Southeast Asian League.?
When Pridi arrived in Washington, the French had their Foreign Ministry oﬃcial, G. Georges Picot, 
get in contact with him. The Pan Union was initially presented to Pridi as Picot?s private proposal. To 
get the Thai to drop their demand for the reacquisition of territory, the proposed Pan Union would re-
semble the Pan American Union. Its purpose would be to enhance interaction in areas such as eco-
nomic aﬀairs, culture and transportation; it would undertake joint planning in order to have access to 
foreign loans which would be used for the union?s development; and its members would include only 
Thailand and France, which would represent Laos and Cambodia who belonged to the French Union. 
The proposal totally excluded Vietnam. By comparison, Pridi?s sahaphan concept for the region was 
 57 In December 1946 Prince Phetsarath took over from Khammao as Prime Minister of the government in exile.
 58 3349, Chao Phetcharat, pp. 144?47. This work is a biography of Phetsarath compiled from the prince?s autobiographical mate-
rials and from information of the book?s author who went by the penname ?3349.? The book states that before the coup d?état 
in November 1947, the Lao, Vietnamese and Cambodian liberation organizations in Bangkok decided to co-operate in pur-
chasing arms and to join hands against the French. Phetsarath said that he carried on negotiations for independence with the 
French through the American Embassy in Bangkok. This author has found no other documentation to date about these activ-
ities of Phetsarath and what connection they might have had with the Thai government?s territorial negotiations.
 59 ?Pan Union? was the expression that Prince Wan used in his report to the Thai government and which Pridi also used in his 2 
July 1947 report to the Prime Minister following his return from the US.
 60 Publicity Department announcement of 5 July 1947 (NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.25/47). In the House of Representatives on 5 No-
vember 1947, Prime Minister Thamrong explained that ?Pan Southeast Asia [the Pan Union] was unconnected with the 
Commission of Conciliation, and negotiations on it took place between Picot and Pridi. Both men conferred with each other 
outside of the framework of the Commission of Conciliation. Picot first made his proposal, then he and Pridi exchanged 
views? (Raingan 2490, p. 3192).
?     ?
Eiji Murashima
182
his Southeast Asian League whose members were the four independent nations of Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and Thailand.61 The two plans were far apart fundamentally, and trying to compromise and 
adjust them ultimately proved impossible.
On 2 July 1947, as already noted, Pridi submitted his report on the conciliation, and on the 5th the 
Publicity Department published the Thamrong government?s announcement entitled ?Franco?Siamese 
Territorial Conciliation and the Southeast Asian League.? The announcement did not publicize the 
contents of the 27 June recommendations by the Franco?Siamese Commission of Conciliation which 
had totally rejected Thailand?s case. The Government was afraid of being criticized by the opposition 
party for conflating Thailand?s demand for the return of territory with the government?s idea of a 
Southeast Asian league. To prevent the territorial mediation outcome from becoming a weapon in do-
mestic political battles, the government argued that it had made every eﬀort in the conciliation to get 
back the four provinces and that sounding out the French about the Southeast Asian League had been 
carried out separately from the conciliation. In its announcement the government made public the 
whole of Pridi?s 2 July report but excluded the 10th paragraph. In that unpublished paragraph Pridi 
had written passionately about the need for the Southeast Asian League:
It is important for us Thai to be cognizant of the international tide. The hope of a great many peo-
ple in Southeast Asia is for the establishment of a Sahapan (Southeast Asian league) or some simi-
lar organization. Should such an organization be set up, we would have to begin thinking whether 
to participate in that organization with Bangkok as the capital or as its metropolis, or if preferring 
not to participate in it, to be isolated from such an organization set up by the Southeast Asian 
countries around us. It is this oﬃcial?s hope that most Thai would not take a narrow domestic 
view in judging the situation. There are those who are opposed, but ultimately the final decision 
will depend on how the majority of Thai judge the situation. But whatever the final outcome, our 
Southeast Asian brethren should understand that there are many people in Thailand who empa-
thize with the high ideals of our Southeast Asian brothers and sisters.62 
On 12 August 1947 the government disclosed the recommendations of the Commission of Concilia-
tion to the National Assembly and sought the judgment of the assembled MPs as whether to accept or 
reject them. As mentioned previously, the government was strongly criticized by Khuang of the Demo-
cratic Party, and by other members of the Assembly. Phra Phisetphanit, (Poc Khun),63 a Khmer Issarak 
partisan, who had been elected to the Thai House of Representatives in the August 1946 supplementa-
ry elections from the Battambang 2nd district, also expressed his displeasure:
 61 Pridi?s report to the Prime Minister, 2 July 1947 (NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.25/47).
 62 Ibid.
 63 From the author?s check of the records at the Thai National Assembly, as an MP, Phra Phisetphanit used the Thai name Wi-
bun Pokmontri; his wife?s name was Chaoon Aphaiwong.
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Today is a momentous day that decides the lives of many people who have looked to the Thai na-
tion to help them get their freedom?.The Thai people lost their territories by force. From the time 
of my childhood I long dreamed that the Thai people would rise up and reclaim their lost territo-
ries. I have given my total support to the Thai people. I have never feared any of the dangers I have 
faced. I sacrificed my all and achieved the wonderful outcome I had worked for [the recovery of 
Battambang in 1941]. It was a splendid victory for the nation. Then by force the government was 
compelled to hand back that which I equated with my own life?The government never consulted 
the people of the four provinces or their representatives beforehand. The French had Lao and 
Khmer people sitting with them at the negotiations in Washington.64 
At a closed-door session of the Assembly on the afternoon of 12 August 1947, Prime Minister 
Thamrong presented the government?s plan for responding to the recommendations of the Commis-
sion of Conciliation, and sought the opinions of the National Assembly. The plan had adopted the pro-
posal of Phra Phisetphanit and other assembly members which called for appealing to the General As-
sembly in accordance with Article 35 of the UN Charter. Thamrong gave the following reasons for 
making this appeal to the UN:
1)  The Commission of Conciliation claimed that making a judgment on the transfer of an estab-
lished political unit (the Kingdom of Laos) was beyond its competence. But what France called 
the ?Kingdom of Laos? was not established until the Franco?Lao modus vivendi of 27 August 
1946. Therefore in the interpretation of the Thai government, the Commission did have the au-
thority to make a judgment, because at the time the Kingdom of Laos had not yet come into ex-
istence. Thus the Commission?s recommendation was flawed because it had failed to make a 
judgment on this issue. Moreover, this failure to make a judgment threatened to cause unrest in 
Laos and Cambodia.
2)  The Commission of Conciliation rejected Thailand?s ethnic, geographic and economic argu-
ments which it presented with maps but never clarified the reasons for its rejection.
3)  The forceful change of sovereignty without ascertaining the opinion of the people living in the 
contested territories could be harmful to peace, which brought the issue within the scope of Ar-
ticle 35 of the UN Charter.
4)  Despite Thailand?s requests, the Commission of Conciliation never surveyed the opinions of 
the local inhabitants.65 
 64 Raingan 2489?90, pp. 500?502. Phra Phisetphanit continued to play a central role in the debate over the disputed territories. 
With the 17 November 1946 Franco?Siamese Agreement of Settlement, Battambang and the other three provinces were ret-
roceded to France, but he and the other members of the National Assembly who had been elected from those provinces did 
not lose their credentials and continued to hold their seats.
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As for the decision to how to respond to the recommendations of the Commission of Conciliation, 
the majority of MPs voiced the view that it was the responsibility not of the National Assembly but of 
the government itself to decide. Finally by a vote of 43 to 19 the Assembly decided not to express its in-
tentions on the recommendations. The next day, 13 August, the Publicity Department for the first time 
made public the Commission?s recommendations, and told the people that the government was in the 
process of examining whether to approve or reject them. Four days before the 1 November 1947 dead-
line for responding to the recommendations, the Thai government presented its response to the Com-
mission?s Chairman:
Our government, which adheres to the objectives and principles of the United Nations, especially 
to the principles of justice, of government based on self-determination, and of liberty for the peo-
ple, finds it diﬃcult to accept the Commission?s recommendations of 27 June 1947?The sympa-
thy that Thailand has toward the independence of the states of Laos and Cambodia was declared 
in the Commission of Conciliation. Our government hereby confirms that it adheres to the princi-
ple of government based on self-determination. This is the only way to bring peace to Southeast 
Asia?Furthermore, our government reserves the right of appeal to United Nations as provided in 
the Charter of the United Nations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.66 
When the government informed the House of Representatives on 5 November that it had rejected 
the recommendations of the Commission of Conciliation, Phra Phisetphanit said that the govern-
ment?s decision coincided with his own group?s demand and he totally supported it. He welcomed the 
government?s statement that the UN?s principle of self-determination should be applied to Cambodia 
and Laos and that they should be given independence.67 Speaking to reporters at a press conference 
about the government?s rejection, Prime Minister Thamrong said,
We rejected it in the national interest. If problems arise in our diplomatic policy because of the re-
jection, I am prepared to resign and make way for a new government. The loss of our territories 
was decided at the time of the conclusion of the formal agreement with Britain [on 1 January 
1946] that forcefully abolished the Treaty of Tokyo?But even with this, we have made every eﬀort 
to uphold the rights and interests of Thailand?If Laos and Cambodia can become independent, 
we will be satisfied. We will examine what to do next now that we have rejected the recommenda-
tions.68 
 66 Announcement of the Prime Minister?s Oﬃce dated 5 November 1947; Publicity Department publication dated 7 November 
1947 (NAT, So.Ro.0201.35/47 and (2) So.Ro.0201.92.1/10; Raingan 2490, pp. 3180?81).
 67 Ibid., p. 3186.
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4.?Developments after the 8 November Coup d?état and during the Cold War
In the early hours of 8 November 1947 a faction in the military headed by Phibunsongkhram over-
threw the Thamrong government in a coup. On the 10th they invited Khuang Aphaiwong, the leader 
of the opposition Democratic Party and a critic of the Thamrong government?s approach to the territo-
rial negotiations, to be the Prime Minister. Soon after the coup, the military confiscated the weapons of 
the Việt Minh in Bangkok and Udorn. On 15 November they raided the Bangkok home of Trần Văn 
Giàu and took away weapons. On 3 December they did the same at the home of Thongin Phuriphat, 
the previous Minister of Industry, and again on 5 December at the home of Thong Kanthatham, the 
former Deputy Interior Minister.69 Meanwhile in Udon on 25 November soldiers and police searched 
the homes of Việt Minh leaders. On 4 December leaflets were scattered around Udon city which read, 
?Phibun is leaning towards the British and Americans. Phibun has broken his promises. We demand 
our weapons [be returned].?70
In a document titled ?Measures for Dealing with the Evacuees? and dated 20 December 1947 sent to 
the Governor of Udon, the new Interior Minister, Lt. Gen. Sinatyotharak, ordered that the Governor 
?explain to them [the Yuan opphayop, Vietnamese evacuees] the necessity and the government?s intent 
for demanding a complete halt to all gatherings, training practices, propagandizing, communications, 
and the accumulation of weapons and war supplies,? and ?tell them to co-operate in maintaining order 
and to carry on as usual with their businesses and work.? The document also informed the Governor 
that the new government?s policy was ?to limit assistance to the Yuan opphayop to humanitarian aid 
only?; that for easier control oﬃcials should have them live together in groups and identification book-
lets should be issued to them; that ?people who behave as good citizens will be protected so they can 
build a foundation for permanent residence, while those who want to return to their home country 
should not be hindered from going?if there are children who wish to study in our public schools, they 
should be accepted.?71A report from the Interior Minister to Prime Minister Khuang gave as the rea-
son for prohibiting Việt Minh activities within Thailand and confiscating their weapons the fact that 
not doing so would cause confusion and misunderstanding in Thailand?s diplomatic relations; more-
over, there was the danger that Việt Minh weapons could be used by groups that opposed the coup to 
attack and topple the government.72 Pridi and his civilian Free Thai government supporters, whom the 
military coup had driven from power, remained in possession of the modern weapons they had re-
 69 NAT, So.Ro.0201.37.6/23.
 70 NAT, So.Ro.0201.37.6/21.
 71 NAT, So.Ro.0201.35/47. In the same vein was the case of the Việt Minh representative in India who applied for a visa to enter 
Thailand after receiving orders from his government to visit Bangkok. The Thai Chargé d?Aﬀaires in Delhi asked the Foreign 
Ministry if it would agree to issue a visa since he did not think there would be any unfavorable eﬀect on Thailand. The For-
eign Ministry in turn queried the Cabinet since there was already a precedent from August 1947 whereby the Cabinet had al-
lowed a representative of the Việt Minh to enter the country. In response, the post-coup Cabinet on 25 November 1947 de-
cided that ?the domestic situation is still not normal, so we want to suspend [permission] temporarily. The Foreign Ministry 
should reject it? (NAT, So.Ro.0201.9.3/32).
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ceived while co-operating with the British and Americans during the war; therefore the Thai military 
worried that these people could join with the Indochinese liberation forces in Thailand to carry out an 
armed uprising against the new government. As will be pointed out further below in connection with 
the November 1948 arrest of Northeastern Thai political leaders on charges of supporting the Lao 
Issara and plotting a separatist revolt, activity in support of Indochina?s liberation came to be looked 
upon as anti-government activity.
However, the Indochina policy of the new military-dominated government was not a 180-degree 
turn away from that of the previous Pridi-dominated Free Thai governments. Although less supportive 
of the Indochinese liberation movements, and displaying an amicable attitude toward the French in In-
dochina73 (which included the dispatch of a military mission to Saigon in September 1948), the new 
government allowed the Việt Minh delegation to Southeast Asia and the Lao Issara government-in-ex-
ile to continue functioning in Bangkok; and along with Thai oﬃcials and the people in general, it con-
tinued to sympathize with the Indochinese movements for independence and to look upon them as 
patriotic movements.
At the time of the military mission?s visit to Saigon in September, led by the Deputy Army Com-
mander, Lt. Gen. Kat Katsongkhram, Prime Minister Phibun set forth his policy:
Thailand must act well and show good will toward all groups. We have a high regard for what is 
human, and we must consider it in broad terms. To praise one side while dragging down the other 
is not the Thai way of thinking. However, acting unlawfully against national laws harms the wel-
fare and happiness of human beings, and this cannot be tolerated. The achievement of indepen-
dence and liberty is the desire of human beings worldwide. But groups fearlessly pursuing their 
nationalist aspirations, should they operate on Thai territory and break Thai laws, harm the na-
tion?s tranquility in many ways and call into question Thailand?s responsibility for maintaining in-
ternational friendship, something of which we have to be especially mindful.74 
The Prime Minister was taking an equidistant stance vis-à-vis both sides fighting in Indochina, and 
he was not going to allow Thai territory to be used in the war.
The French propagandized the Thai telling them that the Indochinese liberation movements were 
communist movements. During 1949 the Associated States of Indochina were set up within the French 
Union which gave partial independence to the Bảo Đại regime in Vietnam (agreement signed 8 
March), the government of Laos (19 July) and the government of Cambodia (8 November). These 
 73 French comment on the first round of negotiations between themselves and the Kat Katsongkhram military mission on 17 
September 1948 (NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.25/6, p. 90); Katsongkhram report of inspection published 26 October 1948; Kat Kat-
songkhram, Banthuk Khosangket lai prakan nai Khrau pai Rachakan Indochin-Farangset mua wanthi 14 Kanyayon Pho. So. 
2491 [Some Impressions from an Oﬃcial Visit to French-Indochina from 14 September 1948] (Bangkok, 1948), p. 42.
 74 Lt. Gen. Kat Katsongkhram report on mission of inspection to Indochina dated 25 September 1948 (NAT, (2) 
So.Ro.0201.25/6), p. 99.
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states were recognized by Britain and the US, and following the lead of these two powers, Thailand 
recognized them on 28 February 1950. But for more than a year after that, until 20 July 1951, the Việt 
Minh?s delegation continued to reside in Bangkok.75 This is a good indication that the Phibun govern-
ment did not fully side with the French against the Indochinese liberation movements until the full 
impact of the Cold War had set in at the start of the 1950s.
Along with allowing the Viet Nam Government Delegation to South East Asia (which represented 
Hồ Chí Minh?s Democratic Republic of Viet Nam) to continue functioning in Bangkok, there is also 
documentation suggesting that following the coup and Phibun?s later return to power, a certain degree 
of friendly relations continued between the Thai and Việt Minh governments. One document is the 
letter of 20 January 1948 in the name of Col. Nguyễn Thanh Sơn, a member of the Viet Nam Govern-
ment Delegation to South East Asia, and addressed to Phibun, then Commander-in-Chief of the army 
(before subsequently replacing Khuang as Prime Minister), which along with asking for the return of 
Việt Minh weapons confiscated by the Thai military, also appealed to Phibun?s long-time sympathy for 
Vietnam?s independence struggle.76 Another document was a letter sent to Phibun following his return 
to power on 8 April 1948. Dated 22 April, the letter was from Lê Hi, acting President of the Vietnam 
Government Delegation to South East Asia, and it congratulated Phibun on his assumption of the 
Prime Ministership. Phibun was absent from Bangkok at the time; therefore on receiving the letter, the 
Cabinet Secretary delivered it to the acting Prime Minister, then immediately drafted a reply. On 27 
April when handed the draft reply for his signature, Phibun decided to hold it back. ?I?ve given it 
thought, but we still can?t have formal contacts with them. Hold oﬀ on replying for the present. It?s bet-
ter to wait for the next opportunity.?77 While not willing to deal formally with the Việt Minh, Phibun 
also did not express any hostile attitude toward the movement and its representatives in Bangkok.
Another piece of evidence indicating that Thai oﬃcials continued to be sympathetic toward the an-
ti-French forces in Indochina is contained in a 29 July 1948 document from the Thai Vice-Consul in 
Saigon to the Foreign Minister. This stated that Saigon newspapers had received information from the 
French authorities reporting on the anti-Vietnamese feelings harbored by the Thai. The Vice-Consul, 
Wikrom Ninnat, who was then in charge of the Thai Consulate-General in Saigon, regarded this infor-
mation as a deliberate French eﬀort to incite a split between Vietnam and Thailand. In the document 
Wikrom commented that, ?Knowing that the Vietnamese hope for Thai assistance, the French are 
afraid of co-operation between Vietnam and Thailand, and they are taking every opportunity to try to 
create bad feelings between the two peoples.?78
To improve Franco?Thai relations, a former French military attaché who had been stationed in Thai-
land visited Bangkok, and at his reception party he proposed to Phibun the invitation of a Thai mili-
 75 NAT, So.Ro.0201.37.6/11.
 76 See Murashima, ?Opposing French Colonialism,? p. 376 note 78.
 77 Ibid.
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tary mission to visit Indochina. Phibun accepted this proposal, and on 21 August 1948 the French 
Legation in Bangkok issued a formal invitation for the visit.79 The military mission, made up of seven 
members led by Lt. Gen. Kat, visited Saigon from 14 to 21 September 1948. The French gave the mis-
sion a hospitable welcome as they sought to gain the co-operation of the Thai military to halt the use 
of Thailand as a sanctuary for Indochina?s liberation movements and to put a stop to the smuggling of 
weapons into Indochina.80
During the mission?s visit, the French proposed a military agreement,81 but Kat rejected this. How-
ever, on 21 September, the day of the mission?s departure from Saigon, at the request of Major Gen. 
Alessandri (Commander of France?s Ground Forces in the Far East), Kat signed a ?Memorandum for 
Negotiations? which laid out in writing procedures for conducting future negotiations. The memoran-
dum enumerated matters that in principle both sides agreed should be examined in order to reach a 
military agreement between Thailand and France in the future. These matters included the expeditious 
exchange of information on the smuggling of weapons and provisions reported by the border guards 
and military liaison oﬃcers on both sides, coordination in supervising the border to prevent insur-
gents from making cross-border escapes, the Thai authorities interdicting all smuggled supplies and 
intercepting their shipment, and the Thai Navy informing their French counterparts about the move-
ment of ships smuggling supplies.82
In line with Phibun?s policy of maintaining equidistance, the Kat Katsongkhram mission did not 
conclude any agreement with the French. However, the report Kat submitted after returning to Bang-
kok indicates that his views were not entirely the same as Phibun?s. In his report Kat said:
The Việt Minh in Bangkok are co-operating with Hồ Chí Minh and carrying on anti-French activ-
ities. They [illegally] have communications equipment; they put out documents slandering the 
French government; they are gathering members; they are bringing in funds from Indochina; and 
they are using Thai territory to carry on such activities as part of their plans to seize power. They 
are getting funds and weapons from China as well as from overseas. The French are making eﬀorts 
to control these activities, but the insurgents take refuge in Thai territory making it diﬃcult to 
pursue them right to the end. Actually Thailand has been intending to co-operate with the French, 
but they have only given us name lists of people who are communists; they have not informed us 
 79 NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.25/6, p. 37.
 80 22 September 1948 report telegraphed by the Thai Legation in Paris about a French newspaper report on the visit of the Thai 
military mission to Saigon which commented that ?the Thai government is expected to come up with ways to crack down on 
Vietnamese subversives in Thailand who have the aim of fighting against a foreign country [i.e., French Indochina]. This visit 
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neutral countries? (ibid., p. 75).
 81 Document No. 12517/2491, report from the Vice-Consul in Saigon to the Foreign Minister dated 2 October 1948 (ibid., p. 
77). The Vice-Consul expressed his opinion that the domestic situation inside Indochina had to be taken into consideration 
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of who has done what illegal activities and where they are living. We cannot punish people just 
because they are communists.?83
From these comments in Kat?s report, one senses that even after the coup, the Thai were not doing 
much to impede or punish the Việt Minh. He went on to express the opinion that the domestic groups 
around Pridi Phanomyong were pinkish communist elements that were co-operating with the commu-
nists in Indochina, and that there was considerable danger of them communizing Thailand. His advice 
was that the Thai government should suppress Pridi and his supporters along with the Indochinese 
communists. He then proposed that Thailand ask France for military assistance.84
While there was a strong feeling of sympathy among the Thai people for the liberation of Indochina, 
the French sought to change the attitude of the Thai leadership by presenting information showing 
that the liberation movements in Indochina were being led by communists. For example, on 8 Decem-
ber 1948 the French Embassy in Bangkok showed the Thai Foreign Minister four documents printed 
in mid-1948 by a ?national salvation association? (samaakhom kuchat) that was an important Việt 
Minh-aﬃliated organization. The French pointed out that the contents of these documents were infor-
mation guides about the Indochinese Communist Party.85 Another example was a photograph that a 
secretary from the Embassy brought to the Foreign Ministry on 2 July 1949. It had come from a Pacific 
issue of Time Magazine and showed Tan Malaka of the Indonesian Communist Party together with Hồ 
Chí Minh. The French wanted to show the Thai just how close Hồ?s relations were with top leaders in 
the communist movement.86
In late 1948 the French Embassy sent over copies of the October 22 and 26 issues of the Vietnam In-
formation newspaper published in Bangkok by the Việt Minh-run Vietnam News Service. Because of 
the communist content in the issues, the French wanted the Thai to clamp down on the newspaper. 
Phibun approved of this move and gave the police instructions to rein in the paper. However, the Di-
rector-General of the Police Department, Chattrakankoson, a close Phibun confidant, told the Prime 
Minister that
The publication law of 1941 allows a wide breadth of freedom in the publishing of newspapers 
which means that the Vietnam Information newspaper can be published like any other newspaper. 
 83 Kat, Banthuk Khosangket, pp. 34?35.
 84 Kat told the French that even if the Thai attempted to suppress the communists, the Thai did not have suﬃcient weapons, and 
he asked the French for tanks, machine guns, hand grenades and communications equipment. The French said they would 
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the Thai army had only antiquated weapons, and the weapons confiscated from the Free Thai after the November 1947 coup 
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The police check the contents of news stories, but unless there is something illegal, they cannot 
prevent articles from being published. The French Ambassador says that we should close down 
the paper because it is communist, but this is not an appropriate reason. Not only is there no law 
against communism, there is also the worry that it could hurt friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union which has opened a legation in Bangkok. The newspaper has not yet published anything il-
legal, so we cannot tighten controls on it right now. 
Phibun was not pleased with this reply, and he repeated his order to clamp down on the paper while 
asking if there were not some way to come up with deportation measures or other means for dealing 
with the aﬀair.87
Despite the concerns of the French and the Thai Prime Minister, the Vietnam News Service contin-
ued operating in Bangkok. When Bảo Đại signed the Franco?Vietnamese agreement on 8 March 1949 
that set up an independent Vietnamese regime within the French Union, the news service printed a 
34-page Thai-language publication titled Bao Dai toklong kap Farangset yangrai. Then on 2 September 
1949, the fourth anniversary of Vietnam?s declaration of independence, the news service published a 
24-page Thai translation of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
With the establishment of Bảo Đại?s State of Vietnam within the French Union, the Soviet Union, 
the People?s Republic of China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and North 
Korea all took this as the opportunity to recognize the DRV.88 In January 1950 the Bangkok-based Del-
egation of the DRV (formerly the Vietnam Delegation to Southeast Asia) submitted to the Thai For-
eign Ministry a copy of an announcement made by Hồ on 14 January. The announcement said:
Although Vietnam and France signed a provisional agreement on 14 September 1946, France has 
not stopped its war in Vietnam, and it has set up the Bảo Đại government. The government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that it represents the general will of the Vietnamese 
people, and that it alone is the legitimate government. In order to build a world of peace and de-
mocracy, the government of Vietnam wants to open diplomatic relations with all governments 
that respect equality and Vietnam?s sovereignty.89 
Clearly the DRV was vying with Bảo Đại?s regime to gain Thai recognition as the legitimate govern-
ment of Vietnam. In February the Thai Cabinet held three meetings to discuss whether or not to rec-
ognize the Bảo Đại government of Vietnam along with Cambodia and Laos, which had been recog-
nized by Britain (on 8 February) and the US (on 9 February). A number of the Cabinet Ministers 
argued against recognition, but the majority approved, and on 28 February the Bangkok government 
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recognized the three independent states of Indochina within the French Union.90
On 17 October 1950 a meeting was held (chaired by Gen. Luang Hansongkhram) to discuss the de-
fense of the kingdom. There it was reported that ?about 5000 of the Vietnamese who have moved into 
and are living in Thailand support Hồ Chí Minh.?91 Some of these people wrote letters to the Thai gov-
ernment criticizing its recognition of the Bảo Đại regime. One such letter, dated 5 July from two peo-
ple in Sisaket province who wrote in Vietnamese, said that
It is regrettable that the Thai government has recognized the Bảo Đại government and allowed it 
to open a diplomatic mission in Bangkok?We [Vietnamese] strictly obey Thailand?s laws; we res-
olutely support the independent government of Hồ Chí Minh; and we only accept the orders of 
Nguyễn Đức Quỳ, the representative [in Bangkok] of Vietnam?s independent government [i.e., the 
DRV]. 
Other such letters were sent, 23 written in Vietnamese and one in Thai. After reading translations of 
these letters, Phibun ordered that it should be made known to everyone that Thailand had recognized 
the Bảo Đại government because it had received its independence from France, and Britain and the 
United States had already recognized it. After receiving the Prime Minister?s order, the Foreign Minis-
try announced in early September that Thailand supported the democratic forces in the United Na-
tions, and on this basis it had given its recognition to the Bảo Đại government.92 Following this the 
acting Foreign Minister, Khemachat Bunyaratphan, submitted an opinion report addressed to the Cab-
inet Secretary:
The reason that the Foreign Ministry had to release its announcement was because Vietnamese 
living in Thailand had written letters addressed to the Thai government that showed they belong 
to the Việt Minh movement led by Hồ Chí Minh. This movement is the adversary of the Vietnam 
government [of Bảo Đại] which has friendly relations with Thailand. The original objective of the 
Việt Minh was to fight for Vietnam?s independence. However, France has given Vietnam its inde-
pendence, is promoting its autonomy; and its government has been recognized by the world?s de-
mocracies. Meanwhile, this [Việt Minh] movement has been in close contact with the communist 
side, and has even been actively trying to bring about the realization of communism. Our country 
is fighting against communism, and is pursuing policies in co-operation with other democratic 
countries to prevent communism. However, these Vietnamese are using the opportunity of living 
in Thailand to carry on communist activities. They are collecting and send out weapons to their 
 90 NAT, (3) So.Ro.0201.9/12, pp. 4, 18, 29. Although Phibun argued for recognition, Foreign Minister Pote was opposed, saying 
it was premature. After the decision to grant recognition, Pote resigned as Foreign Minister; Luang Wichitwathakan, Aran-
ramluk (Bangkok, 1950), pp. 4?5.
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comrades in foreign countries, which clearly shows their intentions?If the situation in Vietnam 
grows tenser than it is now, it is possible that these Vietnamese will become involved in extremist 
acts that will disturb Thailand?s domestic peace and order. Moreover, in the future, when we have 
exchanged diplomatic oﬃcials with the [Bảo Đại] government, there is a danger that Vietnamese 
diplomats could be harmed. When you [the Cabinet] take up the problem of the Vietnamese, we 
want you to take these points into consideration. 
In response Phibun ordered Khemachat to submit the problem of the Vietnamese for immediate 
discussion in the Cabinet.93
These documents show that as the Cold War intensified with the October 1949 victory of the com-
munist revolution in China and then the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Thailand?s leader-
ship decided to stick with the ?democratic camp? of the US and Britain. They recognized the Bảo Đại 
government while greatly increasing their criticism of the Việt Minh communists. As communist 
strength grew in China, the Thai government turned to a policy of severely restricting the entry of 
Chinese into the country. Regarding the Vietnamese, by an order of the Interior Ministry dated 11 Oc-
tober 1949, they would no longer be allowed to flee from Indochina to Thailand, and the entry of Viet-
namese into the country would henceforth be in accordance with immigration laws and regulations 
and a quota system would be applied. For Vietnamese already in the country who were temporary 
evacuees, 19 provinces were designated where they could reside?14 in the Northeast, three in the 
North, and two in the eastern part of the country. In August 1950 this was reduced to eight provinces, 
and Vietnamese living in other provinces were ordered to move to these eight.94
On 20 June 1951, Nguyễn Đức Quỳ and eight other members of the Delegation of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in Bangkok, following instructions from the Thai police, left the country aboard 
an airplane to Rangoon. Five years after the end of World War II and in the midst of the Cold War, the 
Việt Minh delegation in Bangkok had finally ceased to exist. On receiving this news from the Direc-
tor-General of the Police Department, Phibun remarked that ?the communists are creating trouble for 
all of the people; they should all be deported from the country,? and he ordered the Police Department 
to continue investigating communists and their activities.95 Nearly a year-and-a-half later, in Novem-
ber 1952, the government promulgated the Communist Activities Prevention Law.
Turning to the Lao Issara government-in-exile, which had moved to Bangkok after being driven out 
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of Vientiane in April 1946, Northeastern Thai political leaders kept up their support. After the loss of 
its base in Laos, Fong Sitthitham made plans to train a military force for the Issara by recruiting young 
men from the Thai Northeast and sending them to Yunnan for training under the KMT army in Kun-
ming. In 1947 he contacted a former student of his from his days as a middle school teacher in Ubon. 
At the time, this student, Dr. Seng Pathumrat, was residing in the US where he had received a Ph.D. in 
education. Fong asked Seng to return to Thailand and help Laos in its struggle for independence. Fong 
called a meeting at his home in Bangkok to discuss how to further Lao independence. Among those at 
the meeting were Phon Saensaradi, Siphanom Phichitwarasan and Thim Phuriphat, a member of the 
House of Representatives96 and the older brother of Thongin Phuriphat. The meeting decided to seek 
the assistance of the KMT government, and Seng along with Amphon Suwannabon were dispatched to 
Nanjing. The Chinese responded by agreeing to have young Thai from the Northeast and other mem-
bers of the Lao Issara come to Yunnan for military training.97
By late 1947, however, the Bangkok government was picking up signs of suspicious recruiting activi-
ty by anti-government people in the Northeast. A document dated 2 December 1947 from the com-
mander of the Third Military Region to the military Commander-in-Chief reported that
Phra Maha La Anurachawong from Vientiane, along with Amphon Suwannabon of Roi Et prov-
ince have been recruiting people in Kuchinarai district of Kalasin province with exhortations 
harking back to the Anouvong rebellion in 1827 [when the last Lao vassal ruler of Vientiane had 
rebelled against Bangkok?s authority and was eventually captured and put to death]. Many of the 
government oﬃcials in the provinces of Sakhon Nakhon and Kalasin support these anti-govern-
ment people, and they are likely covering up the facts and not reporting them.98 
The report reached the incorrect conclusion that people were being recruited for the armed over-
throw of the post-coup government set up by the military. Unclear at the time, however, was that Phra 
Maha La Anurachawong mentioned in the report was in the midst of recruiting young men in that 
part of the Northeast to be sent for military training in China. This fact was revealed in an interroga-
tion report of a youth who had gone to China for training and had been arrested after returning to 
Thailand in 1953.99 Together these documents oﬀer clear evidence that by the latter half of 1947, Fong 
 96 Born in 1902, Thim was a minister-without-portfolio in 1958 in the cabinet of Thanom Kittikachon.
 97 Siphanom Phichitwarasan?s recollection in Cremation Volume for Fong Sitthitham, pp. 50?55. Fong had close connections 
with the KMT in Bangkok. He also translated Sun Yat Sen?s Three Principles of the People and published it on 28 August 1947. 
Worth noting is his advocacy of nationalism in the preface of this translation in connection with the Lao Issara movement. 
According to Siphanom, because of the Northeast?s poverty, Fong and many of the other political leaders from that region in 
the House of Representatives took a great interest in Sun Yat Sen?s ideas and his concept of socialism (author?s interview with 
Siphanom Phichitwarasan on 5 January 1998).
 98 NAT, So.Ro.0201.32/14.
 99 The case of Pherm Phumseri is mentioned in a 20 August 1953 report to the Cabinet from Phao Sriyanon, Director-General 
of the Police Department. Pherm (born 1920) from Kuchinarai District, Kalasin, had been recruited by Phra Maha LaAnu-
wong and sent to Kunming for military training after which he returned to Thailand (NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.77/29).
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and other Northeasterners were gathering recruits to be sent to China for military training. Siphanom 
Phichitwarasan recalled that
Member of the House of Representatives Thim Phuriphat was at the center of the recruiting of 
youths. Tiang Sirikhan, Thongin Phuriphat and two other people who were former Cabinet minis-
ters were afraid that the government would suspect them [of involvement in military training to 
overthrow the coup group], and they distanced themselves from the work of sending young re-
cruits to China. The recruits traveled overland from Northern Thailand. After sending them oﬀ, 
Dr. Seng Pathumrat and Amphon Suwannabon flew to Hong Kong, then went to meet the recruits 
in Kunming. Only a few groups of recruits had been sent when Fong was arrested on suspicion 
that he intended to lead a separatist [Northeast Thai] rebellion and become the Prime Minister of 
Laos.100 
This recollection is consistent with police interrogation reports on youths who were arrested and in-
vestigated after returning to Thailand from training in China. Groups of young men were sent to Kun-
ming overland from Northern Thailand in mid-1948.101 According to Siphanom a total of about 150 
youths102 were sent, all recruited from Northeastern Thailand and none from Laos. At that time the 
Lao Issara had a military force under the command of Prince Souphanouvong (1909?1995) made up 
of about 1000 Lao fighters along with a small number of people from Northeastern Thailand. This 
force was deployed in small units of a couple of dozen men along the Mekong on the Thai side of the 
river from Chieng Sæng in the north to Ubon in the southeast from where they carried out guerrilla 
attacks into Lao territory. As an advisor to the Lao Issara military, Siphanom was in charge of procur-
ing supplies and equipment. Siphanom also agreed with Prince Phetsarath that upon achieving inde-
pendence for Laos, they would lead Northeastern Thai in a migration to under-populated Laos.103
Suspecting that recruiting people for military training in China was part of a plan by Northeastern 
Thai separatists to build up military strength for overthrowing the Thai government and building a 
greater Laos, on 1 November 1948 the Bangkok authorities arrested Fong Sitthitham, Thim Phuriphat, 
and numerous other Northeastern Thai political leaders for plotting a separatist revolt. That these lead-
ers did harbor some sort of idea of a unified Laos and Northeast Thailand (although whether as a con-
federation or as a greater Laos remained unclear) can also be inferred from Thim?s words when he was 
arrested. Having labored hard to recruit people for training in China, he said, ?If the idea of trying to 
100 Siphanom Phichitwarasan’s recollection in Cremation Volume for Fong Sitthitham, pp. 50–55.
101 NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.77/29.
102 Thai government documentation says 60 youths were sent to Kunming (NAT, (2) So.Ro.0201.77/29).
103 Author?s interviews with Siphanom Phichitwarasan on 5 November 1997 and 5 January 1998. In Bangkok Siphanom devel-
oped a close friendship with Phetsarath, who told him that Laos did not need territory, but that its population was too small 
and he (Phetsarath) wanted only people.
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unite the Thai peoples on the other side of the Mekong is illegal, then put me in jail till I die.?104 Even-
tually, after the communist Chinese took control of Yunnan, the recruits sent for training in Kunming 
separated into those who joined the Lao forces under Souphanouvong and those who returned to 
Thailand (30 men).105 Meanwhile, ?Prince Souphanouvong, because of his preference for communism, 
his submission to Việt Minh orders, and particularly because of his concurrence with plans to let 
armed military forces advance into Laos from across the China?Burma border, was expelled from the 
Lao Issara movement on 15 May 1949.?106
In Paris two months later, on 19 July, the President of France as the leader of the French Union and 
King Sisavangvong of Laos signed an agreement recognizing the independence of Laos within the 
French Union. This independence was only partial as the agreement gave France authority over Lao 
defense, diplomatic and financial aﬀairs. Nevertheless, a majority of the Issara government-in-exile in 
Bangkok saw independence as having been achieved and hoped to join the king?s royal government of 
Laos. Representatives of the two governments met in Bangkok for negotiations mediated by the French 
commissioner to the Kingdom of Laos and the French ambassador to Thailand. These led to the disso-
lution of the Issara government-in-exile and the Issara movement itself, which was announced on 24 
October 1949.107 Following the end of the Lao Issara, Phetsarath chose to remain in Bangkok rather 
than return to Vientiane.
104 Phapkhao Sayamnikhom, no. 20, Nov 1948, p. 15.
105 In the 20 August 1953 report to the Cabinet from Phao; also author?s interviews with Siphanom Phichiwarasan on 5 Novem-
ber 1997 and 5 January 1998.
106 Lao government announcement reported by the Thai legation in Vientiane in a communiqué dated 4 May 1953 (NAT, (3) 
So.Ro.0201.9/4).
107 Document concerning the ?Dissolution of the Lao Issara Government-in-Exile,? dated 30 November 1949, from Foreign 
Minister Pote Sarasin to the Prime Minister (ibid.). In October 1953 the Royal Government of Laos and France concluded an 
agreement giving Laos complete independence.
